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ABSTRACT
The Pulpit and the People: Mobilizing Evangelical Identity
by
Tim Moser
Using ten sermons from five prominent and politically active evangelical megachurch
pastors taken from the 2016 presidential campaign season, this case study utilizes frame
analysis to understand the political relevance of modern evangelical sermonizing. An
inductive frame analysis allows the concept of a collective action frame to be observed as
a process and for patterns to emerge from the source text. Within these sermons,
ministers offer self-identifying evangelicals a vocabulary with which to understand and
describe their own identity. In this context, the Bible is a powerful cultural symbol that
represents an allegiance to traditions that are framed as the bedrock of American
exceptionalism. The boundaries that are drawn and vociferously maintained in this sample
emphasize exclusion over inclusion, especially in terms of salvation and righteousness,
which can emotionally motivate action. In an election year, this sample demonstrates how
evangelical identity is mobilized as an electoral force.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

“If my people, who are called by My name, shall humble themselves and
pray, and seek My face and turn from their wicked ways, then will I hear
from heaven, and will forgive their sin and HEAL THEIR LAND.” (2
Chronicles 7:14, as written on the “Lift the Vote” busses)

The above passage is inscribed on each side of a full-size red, white, and blue
bus—along with a large cross and a “Lift the Vote” logo featuring the date “November 8,
2016.” The “Lift the Vote” bus tour, hailing from Nashville, TN, was a voter registration
drive that sought to increase the number of evangelical Christians that would vote in the
2016 election. On the “Lift the Vote” Facebook page, organizers note that “over 17
million Evangelical Christians did not vote in the past two presidential elections,” and
that “the Council on American Islamic Relations (CAIR) has launched a campaign to
register and turn out the votes of one million Muslims in this election.”1 Co-chair of the
“Lift the Vote” bus tour, Dana Hunsinger Gill, adds that “[f]rom the Supreme Court to the
protection of religious liberties for all, to issues that directly impact the moral decline that
we have been experiencing for too long, it has never been more important in my lifetime
for Followers of Jesus to be organized, pray together, and vote.”2 “Lift the Vote” was not
the only organized initiative to increase evangelical voter turnout in 2016. Franklin
Graham, son of famous evangelist Billy Graham, spearheaded the 50-state “Decision
America” tour, and former Republican presidential candidate Ben Carson led the “My

1

This was taken from the Lift the Vote Facebook page. https://www.facebook.com/liftthevote/ (accessed Nov. 11,
2016).
2
www.liftthevote.org (last accessed November 11, 2016)
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Faith Votes” group, both with the same basic goals as the “Lift the Vote” bus tour
(Hughes 2016). While these “get out the vote” programs did not officially endorse any
candidate or party in particular, there was an indelibly conservative slant to them. That
political conservatism in the United States has had a close relationship with white
evangelical Protestantism over the past 40 years is well-established (Balmer 2006;
Sutton 2015; Swartz 2012; Worthen 2015).
The 2016 election cycle offered an opportune moment to further examine the link
between evangelical faith and conservative politics for several reasons. First,
evangelical Protestants seem to have more staying power than other Christian
denominations; as other denominations continue to see their number of members
dwindle, evangelicals’ numbers have remained fairly steady over the past few years
(Pew Research Center 2016). Second, evangelicals represent a fairly consolidated
voting bloc; about three quarters of self-identified evangelicals have voted for the
Republican presidential candidate in each of the past three US presidential elections,
and as many as 81 percent voted for Donald Trump in November (Smith and Martinez
2016). Finally, as trends in church attendance drift toward the “megachurch” paradigm,
the most prominent evangelical ministers are growing their influence as they are now
preaching to larger weekly congregations than ever before (Chaves 2006; Willaime and
Maddox 2012).
Taken together, these trends—evangelicals’ high rates of church membership,
their predictable voting patterns, and the increasing prominence and visibility of their
pastors—form the basic premise for researching how evangelical leaders talk about
issues that are politically relevant. In the United States, identifying as an evangelical
8

Protestant now seems almost synonymous with identifying as politically conservative.
How is this conservative political ideology maintained by leaders of the evangelical
community? In other words, how do these increasingly influential evangelical ministers
preach politics from the pulpit, whether directly or indirectly? I address these questions
through a content analysis of the sermons of some of the most prominent, and politically
active, evangelical ministers in the United States. The initial investigative structure is
that of a frame analysis, which is rooted in social movement studies (Benford and Snow
2000). The operative question, then, is the extent to which the ministers in this sample
actively participate in “framing wars” over politically relevant issues.

9

CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW
The Persistence of Evangelicalism
Polling data continue to show that more Americans identify as evangelical than
any other religious category with the exception of “unaffiliated” or religious “nones”
(Smith and Martinez 2016). The continuing rise in the number of Americans who
identify as non-religious has been well-documented (Baker and Smith 2015; Jones et al.
2016), but evangelicals are experiencing a slower decline than most other
denominations. According to data collected by the Pew Research Center, white
evangelical numbers shrank by just 0.9 percent from 2007 to 2014, compared to 3.4
perent for mainline Protestants and 3.1 percent for Catholics. The non-religious
category saw an increase of 6.7 percent in the same time period (Pew Research Center
2016). But while secularism is on the rise in the United States as a whole, the voting
population still tends to be largely religious. The Pew Research Center’s preliminary
analysis of exit polls during the 2016 general election shows that those who identify as
“born again/evangelical” comprised 26 percent of the electorate, while the “religiously
unaffiliated” made up only 15 percent (Smith and Martinez 2016). Not only do
evangelicals appear to have staying power in American culture in general, all signs
seem to indicate a persistent and even greater electoral influence as well.
The Evangelical Voting Bloc
Part of the reality of evangelical influence in electoral politics is the growing
uniformity in the way white evangelicals vote. Weekly attendance at an evangelical
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church has become the most reliable predictor of voting Republican in this century
(Campbell 2007). In 2008, 74 percent of white evangelicals voted for Republican
candidate John McCain; in 2012, 78 percent voted for Mitt Romney (Smith and
Martinez, 2016). In the time leading up to the November 2016 election, some pundits
questioned if Donald Trump—who is, as Trump himself admitted to his board of
evangelical advisors, “by no means a saint” (Gainesville Times)—would garner that
same level of support from the evangelical community (Goodstein 2016). Contrary to
those doubts, evangelicals voted even more heavily for Trump than they did for Romney
or McCain at 81 percent (Smith and Martinez 2016).
Finding an exact definition of evangelicalism is a difficult task. In fact, a key
marker of evangelical belief is an aversion to a central denominational authority (Balmer
2006; Bean 2014; Smidt 2013), which makes finding a unifying evangelical doctrine
difficult to pin down. Smidt (2013), while placing emphasis on the wide range of
evangelical belief, offered a definition that is consistent with the predominance of the
literature (see Lindsay 2007), writing that
…evangelical Protestantism is distinguished by the general tendency of its
members to affirm that personal salvation is obtained through Jesus
Christ, to call individuals to conversion by turning from their old selves into
‘a new creature for Christ,’ and to hold the Bible to be the final authority on
all matters of faith and practice. (p. 41)

This definition identifies three beliefs that forge the evangelical identity: individual
commerce with God and “born again” self-identities, an emphasis on evangelism (which
would seem self-evident), and unwavering reliance on biblical guidance for daily life.
None of these tenets seem to require an inclination toward political conservatism, yet
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public opinion research has, time and again, found that the vast majority of white
evangelicals hold political beliefs consistent with American conservatives on a plethora
of issues. From opinions on gay marriage (Gaines and Garand 2010; Olson, Cadge,
and Harrison 2006) to welfare policy (Wilson 1999) and attitudes toward wealth
distribution (McCarthy et al. 2012) and social insurance (Scheve and Stasavage 2006),
researchers have found that white evangelicals demonstrate remarkable consistency on
topical political issues.
These studies have all, in one form or another, used survey data and quantitative
analysis to arrive at these conclusions. To reconcile these findings with assertions from
qualitative methodologists that there is a great deal of variance in evangelical belief
patterns (Balmer 2006; Bean 2014; Smidt 2013) is a difficult task, indeed. How is it that
a group that seems so qualitatively diverse can statistically be reduced to such
uniformity in quantitative public opinion research? I propose that this dynamic can be
more fully appreciated by a systematic, qualitative analysis of elite evangelical
discourse—mediated in the sample for this study through sermons.
Megachurches
While megachurches have their historical roots in 16th Century Europe—when
Protestant architects first began to design large, multi-purpose church buildings—they
did not become a ubiquitous fixture of the suburban American landscape until the 1980s
(Eagle 2015), and it was not until the 2000s that Thumma and Travis (2007) offered the
generally accepted definition of a megachurch as a Protestant congregation with at
least 2,000 regular attendees. The megachurch phenomenon has been described as
part of larger cultural movement toward mass consumerism (Eagle 2015; Marie and
12

Harkin 2010; Sanders 2016; Willaime and Maddox 2012). Fewer people are attending
worship services at churches that are tied to their community or neighborhood, a trend
that reflects the waning small-town culture that was part of the American mystique of the
1950s (Putnam 1995; Wuthnow 1989). Many of the locally-owned “mom and pop”
shops have been replaced by corporate behemoths that emphasize efficiency and
uniformity over charm and a personal touch. In this same way, megachurches are
replacing the community-based neighborhood congregations—representing the
“walmartization of religion” (Wollschleger and Porter 2011).3
Megachurch pastors often do not dispute this observation, but embrace it and
deem the megachurch a significant innovation that helps Christianity adapt to the needs
of modernity. As Rick Warren put it in 1988,
There’s a trend all across America moving away from the small
neighborhood churches to larger regional-type churches. It’s the same
phenomenon with malls replacing the mom and pop stores on the corner.
People will drive past all kinds of little shopping centers to go to a major
mall, where there are lots of services and where they meet their needs.
The same is true in churches today in that people drive past dozens of
little churches to go to a larger church which offers more services and
special programs. (Quoted in Eagle 2015)

The outcome of this trend is that more and more people are attending a small number of
churches. And this does not necessarily mean that more and more megachurches are
being built, but—in the same way that a large corporation might corner a market and

3

In order to avoid misrepresenting Wollschleger and Porter’s work, I should note that they did not find that
megachurches lead to declining numbers for all churches in their area, but mostly just those that “occupy similar
niches” (p. 294). A new evangelical megachurch, for example, seemingly pulls much of its congregants from
smaller evangelical churches—especially those in adjacent counties, interestingly—while mainline Protestant and
Catholic churches seem to be immune to the effect, but a large Episcopal church, for instance, may draw numbers
from smaller Methodist churches nearby.
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see lopsided profits—the churches that are already the largest are also growing the
fastest (Chaves 2006).
Thumma and Bird’s megachurch survey (2015) shows the importance of the
pastor to these large congregations.4 When asked to rate the importance of several
factors in attracting them to the church initially and in retaining their membership,
megachurch attendees rated the “senior pastor” as the highest or second highest factor
on both accounts. That the largest churches are continuing to grow, coupled with the
noted importance of the senior pastor to the worshipers, means the reach and potential
influence of the leaders of megachurches is remarkable. As such, it follows that the
words spoken each week by these pastors may play a role in establishing or
maintaining a coherent worldview within a religious tradition that lacks formal,
ecumenical leadership structures. If this is the case, these sermons are an important
aspect of the Christian Right and its ability to mobilize.5
Christian Nationalism
In terms of evangelical political action, Christian nationalism is a key factor in
evangelical social movements. Christian nationalism can be broadly defined “as a belief
that America has been and should always be distinctively Christian in its identity, sacred
symbols, values, and policies” (Perry and Whitehead 2015: p. 123). Christian
nationalism has been criticized because it can conflate romantic ideals of Christian
4

http://hirr.hartsem.edu/megachurch/database.html (last accessed on December 5, 2016)
Clergy’s political behavior has received considerable attention since the Civil Rights Movement, when the most
politically active ministers tended to be African American or otherwise adherents of liberal theological principles.
This “new breed” of activist clergy was described in contrast to evangelical ministers, whose individualistic beliefs
and premillennialist roots often dissuaded political activism (Hadden 1969; Quinley 1974). The rise of the Christian
Right as a force in U.S. politics demonstrated that this trend had shifted, or perhaps that previous understandings
of the political implications of conservative or individualistic theology were somewhat flawed (Guth et al. 1997).
5
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American heritage with that of White American heritage. Previous studies demonstrate
that Christian nationalist belief is a reliable predictor of both anti-immigration stances
(McDaniel, Nooruddin, and Shortle 2010), opposition to trans-racial adoption (Perry and
Whitehead 2015), and opposition to same-sex marriage (Whitehead and Perry 2015).
The latter study in particular has been used to argue that—in some cases—in the
ostensible quest for religio-national purity, an embrace of ethno-national purity is laid
bare. This argument is problematic in its breadth. While there is overlap between
Christian nationalism and white nationalism—especially within white nationalist
movements that made national headlines in 2017—the two movements are distinct
phenomena.
In terms of identity work (which will be discussed in detail in this analysis),
Christian nationalism is a key motivating factor for evangelical social movements in the
United States. The idea that the United States has always been, and should continue to
be, a nation founded on Judeo-Christian principles can inform a variety of political
beliefs. In the 1970s, Jimmy Carter and other prominent evangelicals argued that the
United States’ Christian roots involve a mandate to foster inclusion and equality
(Banwart 2013). Christian nationalism is not an inherently racist ideology, but can be
used as a moral justification for selective exclusion from American prosperity (McDaniel,
Nooruddin, and Shortle 2010). For my study, Christian nationalism is an important
concept because of what it symbolizes: a unified history of American identity. From
Christopher Columbus to the Massachusetts Bay Colony to placing “under God” in the
pledge of allegiance, Christianity—to the evangelical—is precisely what made America
great.

15

Evangelicalism and Conservatism: A Brief History of a Movement
Before the Moral Majority
The 1980 election was a watershed moment for evangelical political organizing,
but even before Jerry Falwell’s “Moral Majority” backed Ronald Reagan over Jimmy
Carter (the first self-professed evangelical to be elected president) in 1980, the
foundation for a partnership between evangelicals and American conservatism had
already been established. An important instance of the impact that evangelical political
organization could have on the electoral process was in 1928, when evangelicals were
mobilized antagonistically to defeat Al Smith. Smith was the Democratic nominee for
president, a Catholic, and purportedly a heavy drinker. Evangelicals had previously
organized in favor of prohibition, and then used that fervor to cement opposition to
Smith (Sutton 2015).6 That victory helped to prompt a concerted effort to organize
fundamentalist opposition to modernism in the 1930s and 1940s—an opposition that
stemmed from anti-evolution sentiments (ibid)—and led to the establishment of the
National Association of Evangelicals (NAE) in 1942.
What had been a discursive movement that almost sporadically found issues
around which to organize—the additions of “under God” to the Pledge of Allegiance and

6

Catholicism in the United States was, and to a large extent still is, the denomination of the immigrant. While the
opposition to Smith was ostensibly about prohibition, anti-immigration sentiments fueled much of evangelicals’
general distaste for Catholicism in the early and mid-20th Century (Bloom et al. 2015; Nteta and Wallsten 2012;
Wickersham 2013), representing an early example of the link between evangelicalism and a discomfort with social
change.
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“in God we trust” to U.S. paper currency in the 1950s, for instance (Balmer 2006)—
found the context for becoming a steady oppositional political force in the culture wars
of the 1960s. Anti-Communist sentiment, coupled with a distinct distrust of academia,
placed the evangelical movement firmly in opposition to many progressive social
movements in the 60s and 70s. It was in this context evangelical leadership began
fervently advocating direct involvement in political affairs. One of the founding members
of the NAE, Harold Ockenga, encouraged involvement in “world leadership,” saying that
“evangelicals should be thrust into political, diplomatic, military posts of responsibility
and leadership” (quoted in Sutton 2015: p. 314).
This was a relatively new turn for evangelicals. Their fundamentalist,
premillennial roots often discouraged them from getting involved in social or political
issues. Premillennialism refers to the belief in a particular interpretation of scripture that
asserts that humanity is living in the “end times,” that the rapture is imminent and faithful
Christians will soon be instantaneously transported to a temporary Heaven, after which
will be seven years of tribulation, followed by the Second Coming of Jesus, who will
defeat God’s enemies and establish a thousand year reign (hence, “premillennialism”)
on earth.7 Every war or economic downturn was surely a sign that the apocalypse was
nigh. However, after countless prophecies that foretold specific dates for the rapture
proved wrong, and year after year faithful, God-fearing Christians continued to dwell
upon the earth, the number of prophecies foretelling the rapture and the Second
Coming slowly declined. Partly because of the abeyance of doomsday prophecies,

7

The imminence of the rapture is the defining premillennial belief. Modern evangelicals still largely believe that
this sequence of events will still happen, but often from setting specific timelines. The persistence of apocalyptic
belief among evangelicals is the central theme of Sutton’s (2015) “American Apocalypse.”
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partly as a reactionary movement to 1960s and 70s progressivism, evangelicalism
began to form a powerful political entity.
Prior to the arrival of the “Moral Majority” on the political scene, evangelicalism’s
link to conservative politics was not nearly as pronounced. Balmer (2006), Swartz
(2012), Worthen (2013) each wrote about the political heterogeneity that existed in
evangelicalism in the 1970s, profiling evangelical members of Students for a
Democratic Society and highlighting formal groups of left-wing evangelical activists such
as Evangelicals for McGovern and Evangelicals for Social Action. When Jimmy Carter
became the first US president to identify as evangelical, Newsweek termed 1976 “the
year of the evangelical” (Balmer 2006). By the end of Carter’s presidency, however,
evangelicals who had organized around pushing for racial and economic justice were
pushed to the margins of evangelical leadership structures.
The case of the Southern Baptist Convention (SBC), offers an example of how
this political homology was achieved. In 1967, two emerging leaders of the SBC met at
Café Dumonde in New Orleans and discussed their shared concern for the future of
their denomination. Paul Pressler, an attorney from Houston, wanted to start a
scholarship fund for conservative seminary students. Paige Patterson, an administrator
at the New Orleans Baptist Theological Seminary, expressed interest and so the
meeting was set (Mohler 2005).
As Patterson (2003) himself describes it, much of the conversation that night at
Café Dumonde revolved around the bureaucratic machinery of the SBC shifting from
“substance to method” (p. 16) at the denominational level. Their fear was that, in an
effort to expand its numbers, the SBC had abandoned its identity as a loose
18

confederacy of congregations to a strong bureaucratic machine with leaders who “were,
so it seemed…invincible” (p. 17). Patterson was particularly concerned about the
growing number of liberals involved in the church leadership who had “imbibed deeply
at the well of historical-critical scholarship” (p. 17) and pointed to a book by a Baptist
seminary professor that “employed historical-critical assumptions, conclusions, and
methodologies which led the professor to question the historicity of some of the
narrative portions of Genesis” (p. 15). Ten years of organizing later, Patterson and
Pressler convened with a group of like-minded clergy and laity at the Atlanta airport to
develop a strategy to change the theological and cultural trajectory of the SBC.
Several agreements developed out of the Atlanta meeting. Conservatives,
it was agreed, had a choice. Either they could stand by and watch a 14
million member, 38,000 church denomination be held captive by a coterie
of slick religio-political “denomicrats” or else conservatives could take their
concerns to people in the pew and see if the programs and structures of
the denomination could not be reclaimed for orthodoxy and evangelism.
Most believed that if they did not act immediately, all hope to rescue the
denomination from its slow and seemingly inevitable drift to the left would
be lost. Already the denominational raft was swept along by the white
water currents that propelled American Baptists, British Baptists, United
Methodists, and a host of other denominations to a mooring far removed
from the havens of their founders. (p. 18)

Over the next decade, conservatives gradually grew their influence in the SBC
through a grassroots movement that largely echoed a national shift toward
conservatism in the 1980s (Ammerman 2008; Mohler 2005). In 1990 the SBC elected
its fourth consecutive conservative president, and the remaining moderates left the SBC
to found the Cooperative Baptist Fellowship the following year (Ammerman 2008),
establishing a largely uniform political ideology among Southern Baptists.
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This example is consistent with those described by Worthen (2014), who
included the story of Jim Wallis—founder of the left-leaning Sojourners magazine and
member of the Students for a Democratic Society. Wallis, who was raised in the
evangelical Plymouth Brethren church, was ostracized by the evangelical elites who
wished to purge their ranks of alleged communist sympathizers. Balmer (2006), wrote
of his personal experiences with the leadership of Christianity Today, where he was
ousted as an (unpaid) editor after making a public stand for abortion rights. “The
evangelical subculture” he writes, “doesn’t suffer rebels gladly, and it is especially
intolerant of anyone with the temerity to challenge the shibboleths of the Religious
Right” (p. 168).
The Era of the Moral Majority
Jerry Falwell united right-wing evangelicals and other socially conservative
Christians, such as Catholics and Mormons, under the banner of protecting and
preserving “the family.” The Moral Majority gained prominence and consolidated a large
segment of the voting population “by portraying abortion, feminism, and gay rights as a
tripartite assault on the family” (Dowland 2009: p. 627); indeed, this manner of framing
these controversial issues was “the genius of the movement…after all, who was going
to argue against families” (ibid: p. 607)? Local pastors reacted by participating in the
newly formed Religious Roundtable, which was formed to aid ministers in encouraging
their congregations to vote for candidates who were “pro-family” or “pro-morality.” In
preparing for the 1980 election, the Religious Roundtable sponsored a meeting
attended by over 15,000 conservative ministers and laity, and the Moral Majority—with
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a campaign “war chest” totaling millions of dollars—threw all of its resources into
mobilizing voters to support Ronald Reagan (Banwart 2013).
For his part, Reagan fully embraced the support of the evangelical community.
He personally addressed that meeting of the Religious Roundtable, the first National
Affairs Briefing, and echoed the framing strategy used by Falwell and other leaders of
the New Christian Right.
Today, you and I are meeting at a time when traditional Judeo-Christian
values, based on the moral teachings of religion, are undergoing what is
perhaps their most serious challenge in our nation's history. Nowhere is
the challenge to traditional values more pronounced than in the area of
public policy debate. So it is fitting that the topic of our meeting should be
national affairs, for it is precisely in the affairs of our nation where the
challenge to those values is the greatest. In recent years we have seen a
new and cynical tactic on the part of those who would seek to remove
from our public policy debate the voice of traditional morality. This tactic
seeks not only to discredit traditional moral teachings but also to exclude
them from public debate by intimidation and name-calling.8

If it had not been before, at that point the “framing war” was officially in full swing.
Reagan, Falwell, and a host of other leaders of the Christian Right effectively equated
abortion, the Equal Rights Amendment, homosexuality, and the “career woman” to an
assault on traditional values and unmistakable indicators of America’s moral decline.
This time, rather than retreat into isolation and prayerfully await the rapture, the
fundamentalist wing of American evangelicalism hurled itself into political prominence.
By the end of the 20th Century, any liberal bent to evangelical culture had been pressed
to the margins.

8

This entire speech is available as a primary source through the Carnegie Melon University Digital Collections.
http://digitalcollections.library.cmu.edu/awweb/awarchive?type=file&item=684006 (last accessed December 4,
2016)
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This dynamic did not arise organically but was intentionally forged by leaders of
the Christian Right, a fact which serves as the launching point for this study. Much has
been written about conservative evangelicals’ influence on political leaders at every
level of government, as well as the purging of liberalism among denominational leaders,
but less has been written about how evangelical leaders influence political belief at the
individual level. This study is designed to better understand how that ideological
consistency is achieved among rank-and-file evangelicals. The overarching premise for
this study is that the Sunday sermon is a direct link between evangelical leadership and
millions of individual evangelical congregants, thus by examining the content of a
sample of these sermons I can offer some insight as to how the Christian Right
mobilizes its individual adherents. At its core, this study is specifically examining elite
evangelical rhetoric and how that rhetoric is related to “rank and file” evangelicals.
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CHAPTER 3
THEORETICAL FOUNDATION:
SOCIAL MOVEMENTS AND SYMBOLIC INTERACTIONISM
The key methodological principle that guides this research is “frame analysis.”
Loosely following Johnston and Noakes (2005), my first aim was to recreate the
“strategic construction of collective action frames” (7). The frame itself, however, is not
the end goal of this analysis. Rather, my study aims to leverage the frame analysis
method to observe the cultural and emotional characteristics that unify American
evangelicalism and link it to expressly conservative political movements. More
specifically, I am observing a certain aspect of “subcultural identity work” (Schwalbe and
Mason-Schrock 1996, 117) that not only maintains group boundaries, but allows that
identity to become a cultural resource that is mobilized into a social movement.
Though introduced to the social sciences by anthropologist Gregory Bateson in
1954 (Johnston and Noakes 2005), the concept of frame has been particularly
influential in sociology, largely because of Erving Goffman’s (1974) book on the subject.
This idea has been an intricate component of social movement studies since the early
1980s, when Gitlin (1980) explored the media coverage of Students for a Democratic
Society. Not long after, Gamson et al. (1982) turned the notion of framing away from
the news media and explored how a movement itself could challenge how an
authoritative entity frames it, and thus exercise agency in how the movement is
perceived. In short, frame analysis allowed a constructionist critique of the prevailing
structural social movement theories at the time, which centered on resource
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mobilization (McCarthy and Zald 1977) and political opportunities in a movement’s
external environment (McAdam 1982).9
With frame analysis, social movement theorists were able to impart social
psychological aspects of “meaning work” to the extensive body of literature on social
movements (Tarrow 1992). This is a central principle of symbolic interactionism—that
meaning is interpreted and modified through interactive processes (Blumer 1969). The
application of interaction analysis was offered as a solution to the shortcomings of
macro-level theories of social movements. Benford and Snow (1988) lamented the
stagnation that had gripped social movement studies because of the emphasis placed
on “describing movement ideology” (p. 197), in particular because that emphasis tended
to treat “meanings or ideas as given, as if there is an isomorphic relationship between
the nature of any particular set of conditions or events and the meanings attached to
them” (p. 198). That article provided the most substantial contribution to frame analysis
to date (with the possible exceptions of Bateson for birthing the idea and Goffman for
bringing it to sociology), elaborating on the framing process and developing it as a
distinct methodology. Namely, they introduced the analytical concept of “collective
action frames.”
For Benford and Snow, collective action frames are salient analytical tools
because they have a constructionist, processual character. As Gamson (1992) put it,
“collective action frames are not merely aggregations of individual attitudes and

9

McAdam (1982) did allow for some meaning construction. While his primary focus was on the political
opportunities—that is, the external sociopolitical structures—that allowed the Civil Rights Movement to gain
traction, he also pointed out the necessity for social movement actors to recognize that those opportunities exist.
He used the term “cognitive liberation” (1982: p. 48) to describe the phenomenon that necessarily precedes and
facilitates that recognition.
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perceptions but also the outcome of negotiating shared meaning” (p. 111), which once
again evidences the theoretical importance of symbolic interactionism to frame analysis;
this type of analysis is focused squarely on the process by which rhetoric becomes a
symbolic resource that can aid in—among other things—identity formation and
maintenance. When undertaken with due empathy and rigor, frame analysis can help
outsiders understand the role of emotions in social movement mobilization (Groves
1995). Emotions can be powerful motivators of action, a fact which is leveraged in
framing processes.
To operationalize frame analysis, Benford and Snow (1988; 2000) dissect the
process of framing and present concepts applicable to observation and analysis. These
core concepts of collective action frames focus attention on distinct “tasks” that framing
entails. They are diagnostic framing, prognostic framing, and motivational framing.
These tasks served as the catalysts for my frame analysis of elite evangelical ministers’
sermons by largely shaping my initial coding frame. Diagnostic frames identify the
grievances of a social movement, or the conditions that members of the movement
would like to see change. This include “injustice frames” and “boundary frames”
(Benford and Snow 2000). Injustice frames are methods of claiming victimization, or
asserting that the group in question has been the victim of systematic injustice.
Boundary frames are efforts by movements “to create in-group/out-group distinctions.”
What are the grievances claimed by evangelical ministers? How do they describe the
injustice that has befallen their group? How do they establish and/or maintain
boundaries with the secular world, that is, how do they define membership in the ingroup?
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Prognostic frames deal mainly with responses from outside the group. This
process includes counterframing, or anticipating and addressing criticism to provide
group members with the vocabulary to respond. Prognostic frames also demonstrate
how one particular social movement organization differentiates itself from other, similar
organizations. In the case of evangelicals, the operative questions ask how ministers
respond to outside criticism and negative characterizations. How do ministers
distinguish their group and give it primacy over other denominations or belief patterns?
Motivational frames constitute what Gamson (1995) calls the “agency
component” of frame analysis. How do ministers’ rhetorical devices add to their
congregants’ sense of ability to create change in their own sphere of reality? How do
ministers try to uplift and inspire their congregants to engage actively in the movement?
Emotions are a key aspect of motivational framing because they have been shown to be
causal factors in movement activity (see Jasper 2011). As Jasper (2011; 2017) has
noted, emotions have long been overlooked in social movement studies largely because
of the entrenched legacy of Rational Choice Theory which depicted emotional reactions
as irrational. Subsequently, emotions were overlooked in favor of focusing on
environmental factors that could facilitate or obstruct movement mobilization. Frame
analysis helps to bring emotions into consideration when studying a social movement
largely because motivational framing explicitly acknowledges the importance of
individual emotions as a motivator of action. That said, emotions are intricately involved
in social movements in ways other than just motivational framing.
Of these framing tasks, boundary framing may be most critical to understanding
the evangelicalism as a social movement. Not only does the establishment of
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boundaries create in-group/out-group distinctions, but the nature of these boundaries—
absolute righteousness and eternal life on one side, grievous error and eternal
damnation on the other—indicates the importance of emotional aspects involved in
these framing processes. Having a traditional identity—such as a has emotional
consequences, and those emotional consequences can be operationalized by
charismatic leaders (Jasper 2017). Boundary framing also overlaps with what some
social movement researchers term “cultural resonance” (Park 1998), or the idea that a
collective action frame must resonate within the cultural context from which the
movement draws its resources. That cultural context, which includes an incredibly
influential collective identity and set of symbols, is crucial to this analysis.
In light of this, I will briefly sketch the general terms that I use to describe culture
and its components. Following Williams and Alexander (1994), I define a “movement
culture” as “the collection of ideas, symbols, meanings, and values that forms a
movement's self-identification” (p. 2). Using this definition, the importance of boundary
framing becomes evident. The cultural resources that fuel the evangelicalism revolve
around the varying ways each individual self-identifies as a member of that movement.
A movement ideology is itself a cultural resource that “must provide adherents with a
language with which to attack the evils of the world” (ibid p. 3). Ideologies bridge the
group and the individual by establishing a common vocabulary for individuals to use to
describe the world around them. Snow and Benford (2000) in describing how framing
relates to ideology, note that framing processes consist, in part, of “remedial ideological
work” (p. 9). Framing theorists view ideology as a cultural resource—meaning ideology
is intricately related to self-identity—that is articulated through collective action frames.
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Taking a symbolic interactionist approach, Schwalbe and Mason-Schrock (1996)
contend that the boundaries that form in-group/out-group distinctions are socially
constructed through group interaction, forming “symbolic resources” that group
members tap to inform their presentation of self. They term this process “subcultural
identity work” (p. 117). As a subculture, evangelicals generate a number of “symbolic
resources” that aid in identity construction, not the least of which is perceived conflict
and persecution. Smith (1998) highlighted the importance of feeling persecuted to
identifying as evangelical. For at least a century, evangelical leaders have asserted that
true Christians are dwindling in number and that “worldly” forces are constantly at work
against the evangelical Christian. The idea that “true” Christianity is growing less and
less compatible with modernity is a familiar tone of evangelicalism, and one that
indicates a vital source of boundary construction. Evangelicals espouse more than an
“us against them” mentality, in this case it is clearly an “us against the world” mentality
that provides a symbolic resource for identity construction. Mobilizing individuals for
whom these symbolic resources are crucial to their own self-identity can be an
emotional process. In terms of frame analysis, the question for this study is how
evangelical ministers use these symbolic to emotionally motivate specific political
action.
Studying Evangelicalism as a Social Movement
Social movement scholars do not generally have to belabor the idea that what
they are studying is, indeed, a social movement. A frame analysis that is rooted in social
movement studies makes certain assumptions about the group in question, or more
specifically, makes assumptions about the goals of the group in question. Social
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movements are action-oriented; they are seeking a particular end, and almost always
petition some sort of government entity to address a set of grievances. Evangelicalism
can be conceptualized heuristically as a social movement, but is more a social
movement industry rather than a social movement organization.
A social movement industry (SMI) is a broad field wherein many social
movement organizations (SMOs) may exist. Groups like “Lift the Vote” and “My Faith
Votes” are specific SMOs that partly constitute a SMI. Social movement industries are
typically organized around one specific issue (McCarthy and Zald 1977). For instance
the Sierra Club and Earth First! are single organizations that are both part of the larger
industry of environmental movement organizations (EMOs); the organizations operate
independently but are mobilized around the same issue(s). At the risk of sounding
redundant, social movement organizations have a distinctly organizational quality,
usually with a leadership structure.10 Social movement scholars, who tend to favor
ethnographic or other qualitative methods, typically place SMOs and the actions and
words of the social movement actors—or the media coverage of those words and
actions—at the heart of their analysis. Though the exact nature varies, social movement
studies almost always center on one or more SMOs, or on groups that can at least be

10

New Social Movements, which sprung up as “lifestyle movements” in the 1960s, often tried to embrace a nonhierarchical structure. These movements (movement industries, technically) tended to reject hierarchical
structures as they often were birthed within critical scholarship. Some members of the original New Social
Movements would go on to start cooperatively owned radio stations, grocery stores, or anything wherein they
could try to make an egalitarian organizational structure work. For more on New Social Movements and how that
phenomenon has persisted and evolved through the decades, see Gitlin (2012).

29

characterized as such.11 Evangelical Protestantism is not purely a social movement,
and thus an evangelical church is not purely a social movement organization.
Despite this, sermons serve as a useful medium for examining the evangelical
social movement. While not explicitly social movement material, this sample provides a
unique insight into the cultural context from which social movement organizers tap
resources—in the form of a collective identity—and mobilize individual adherents. As a
social movement study, what follows is fairly unique. Jasper (2017) noted a disconnect
between social movement studies and social psychological understandings of emotion,
especially as it relates to traditional collective identities. Studies of movements
grounded in traditional ethnic or religious identities have focused on strategies regarding
“power and inclusion” at a cognitive level, but tend to ignore “what it feels like to have
one of these traditional identities” (p. 291). This study hopes to, in some measure,
bridge that gap. While cognitive constructs certainly play a role in the construction and
maintenance of collective identities, the emotional appeal of living with a conservative
Christian identity must be understood. This analysis is not aimed at the direct political
rhetoric that would be found at traditional social movement gatherings, but instead
seeks to get to the heart of the movement and uncover some of the emotional aspects
and consequences of identifying as an evangelical Christian. In terms of symbolic
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Frickel (2004), for instance, applied frame analysis to demonstrate how a group of scientists effectively
established a new accepted interdisciplinary science. Ostensibly, this group of scientists may not appear to be a
traditional SMO, but all of the data Frickel analyzed (public lecture, editorials, articles, and expert testimony) were
expressly designed to meet a particular end. Frickel’s analysis, then, implicitly characterized this collective effort to
achieve a common goal as a social movement organization. This characterization was effective because the
collective action was centered on a specific issue and was intended to bring about a certain end.
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interactionism, this study seeks to uncover the process of subcultural identity work that
occurs within elite evangelical rhetoric.
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CHAPTER 4
METHODS
The body of literature on the sociology of religion largely lacks a comprehensive,
qualitative content analysis of sermons. Draper and Park (2010) conducted a content
analysis of 100 sermons, 50 from mainline Protestant ministers and 50 from evangelical
Protestant ministers, but their focus was on the way ministers from each tradition
address secular cinema—essentially conducting a study of how ministers from two main
denominations maintain boundaries between the religious and the secular. Their
sampling technique was designed to claim a modicum of generalizability. By using a
more selective sampling technique, I am giving vividness of description primacy over
numerical generalizability.
This project is designed as a case study. I selected 5 of the most prominent
evangelical pastors in the country, using then-presidential candidate Donald Trump’s
Evangelical Advisory Board as my initial sampling frame. That criterion narrows the field
only slightly, but the Evangelical Advisory Board does not exclusively feature ministers.
James Dobson, Richard Land, Ralph Reed, and Jerry Falwell Jr., for example, are all on
the board and have a background in ministry, but do not reliably preach sermons every
Sunday, excluding them from consideration. 12 Other prominent figures of the board
include politicians (Michele Bachmann, for example) televangelists (not the target of this
study), and attorneys. Further, the ministers in this sample are all megachurch pastors,
expanding the reach and potential resonance of their sermons. Finally, and most

12

Arguably, each of these men have moved on to full-time social movement activism on behalf of the Christian
Right.
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simply, this sample only includes ministers whose sermons are available, free of
charge, through iTunes podcasts. Only 4 of the ministers on Trump’s Evangelical
Advisory Board meet all of these criteria. For the fifth minister in the sample, I turned to
a similar committee that advised Senator Ted Cruz’s presidential campaign. The
following list provides a few details about the ministers whose sermons comprise the
sample.
Jentezen Franklin is the senior pastor at Free Chapel Church, based in
Gainesville, Georgia. Free Chapel has multiple sites, including one in Irvine, California.
He, along with his wife, host a television show called Kingdom Connection. He has
identified himself as “pro-life, pro-traditional marriage, and pro-Israel.” Franklin
champions his churches’ racial diversity and has the most interaction with his
congregants while sermonizing—“Somebody say Amen!” is one of his most common
lines.
Jack Hibbs is the only minister in this sample who was not a part of Donald
Trump’s Evangelical Advisory Board. He did, however, serve on a similar committee for
Senator Ted Cruz’s bid for the Republican nomination for the Presidency. Hibbs is by
far the most politically outspoken minister in this sample—he is the only one to explicitly
endorse a presidential candidate from the pulpit. While the other ministers avoid direct
political endorsements, Hibbs unapologetically declared his support for Ted Cruz,
initially, and then the Republican Party platform after Trump defeated Cruz in the GOP
primary. Hibbs often incorporates videos into his sermons, including a montage on
September 11 that recalled that day’s tragedies in 2001. He also has featured clips of
himself as a guest on conservative talk shows in his sermons.
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Robert Morris is the senior pastor at Gateway Church in Texas. Gateway Church
started the “Vote Under God” website in 2016. Morris, who has authored 14 books, has
said the key issues facing the country today are “the definition of marriage, the right to
life, government versus private health care, the national debt, and religious freedoms.”
Morris is the successful author of “The Blessed Life” and “The Blessed Church,” and
speaks of having “quiet time” with God while swimming laps in his pool or relaxing in a
hot tub with his wife.
Robert Jeffress is the senior pastor at First Baptist Church of Dallas. Tim Tebow
reportedly backed out of a scheduled appearance at First Baptist of Dallas after Jeffress
claimed that homosexuality “represents a degradation of a person’s mind.” He was also
quoted as saying that “any Christian who would sit at home and not vote for the
Republican nominee … is being motivated by pride rather than principle.” Jeffress
spoke at President Donald Trump’s Inauguration “prayer breakfast.” During the fall of
2016 Jeffress preached a 10-part sermon series entitled “A Place Called Heaven,” that
entire sermon series comprises Jeffress’s part of the sample.
Ronnie Floyd is a former president of the Southern Baptist Convention and
senior pastor of Cross Church, based in Arkansas. Floyd was involved in the
movement through the 1980s that purged liberals from the ranks of the Southern Baptist
Convention. He is politically outspoken, but is cautious in how he addresses politics
from the pulpit, never endorsing a candidate specifically but focusing on specific
platforms and issues.
My sample for this analysis includes 10 sermons from each pastor, in some
cases stretching back as far as March of 2016. According to the database of
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megachurches maintained by Warren Bird, these five ministers collectively reach a live
audience of over 65,000 each week—not including their online presence.13 Most of the
sample will cluster around the November election and the weeks leading up to it, but,
where available, I also have included sermons from around the time of the Republican
and Democratic conventions in July, and even back to the primaries. This selection
process should facilitate a frame analysis of the larger social movement. This is not
intended to be a representative sample of evangelical ministers, or even a proper
representative sample from these pastors. Based on the timing of this study and when
the sermons in the sample were preached, the hope is that these ministers would speak
more directly about political issues than in less politically volatile times. The pastors
themselves, while providing the objects of analysis, are not the point of the analysis.
This study is not about these pastors, but what their sermons demonstrate about the
remarkable consistency of white evangelical public opinion.
For the coding process, I used Nvivo to sort through several hundred pages of
sermon transcripts. My initial coding frame was based on those “framing tasks”
described by Benford and Snow (2000). Originally, I listed “boundary framing” as a child
node of diagnostic framing. As I coded, I found that boundary framing would be the
single most prominent pattern in terms of framing tasks. With over two hundred
references, I subdivided boundary framing into different child nodes, including
“adversarial framing,” “’Bible’ Christian,” and “saved/born again.” Importantly, many of
the references I coded as “boundary framing” also went into a node I added well into the
coding process: identity work. Despite the great deal of overlap between boundary
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http://hirr.hartsem.edu/megachurch/database.html (last accessed on December 5, 2016)
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framing and identity work, the latter deserved its own code because it became a central
theme of the analysis.
I included a code that I titled “about the author,” which was subdivided into codes
that highlighted the use of technology or other sermon aids, as well as moments when
the speaker used humorous illustrations or demonstrated scholarly authority. Also in the
“about the author” code was what I titled “bumper sticker.” There is an old adage that a
good sermon’s general message should fit neatly onto a bumper sticker. For each
sermon I coded, I tried to find a brief passage—usually found towards the end of the
sermon—that largely sums up the theme of that sermon. While none of those quotes
made it into the final draft of the analytical section, this proved to be a useful
methodological task because it forced me to focus on each sermon’s context so that
each quote I did use was true to its source.
I included a code for “polemics,” which I subdivided by topic to include gay
marriage, abortion, evolution, intellectualism, family values, religious freedom, and the
media. Those child nodes were, somewhat surprisingly, sparsely used—and none of
those issues ever made it onto a sermon’s “bumper sticker.” Despite the fact that these
nodes were not as populated as I anticipated, how and when these issues were
referenced still proved extremely important to the analysis. I also included a code for
Christian nationalism that included references to the nation “turning its back on God,” or
instances where ministers advocated taking their evangelical identity with them to the
polls.
The codes for diagnostic and prognostic framing were crucial to getting the
analysis started, but waned in prominence as I continued the coding process. This was
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largely because these codes became so repetitive. Most of the diagnostic framing that I
referenced also fell into another category—identity work, boundary maintenance,
Christian nationalism—and those other categories indicated some important patterns.
The overlap between Christian nationalism and diagnostic framing was of particular
import—indicating the link between the perception of eroding tradition and the
grievances claimed by the ministers. The prognostic framing code was largely full of
platitudes (“Jesus is the answer” for instance), and did not—on its own—produce a
wealth of interesting patterns. The motivational framing code, however, was a vital
theme to the analysis because the ministers’ motivational tactics almost always made
some sort of play on evangelical identity.
Another important code that was added well into the coding process was
“descriptions of the Bible.”14 I used this code any time a minister said “the Bible is…” or
“the Bible says…” and noted whether or not a scripture passage was quoted or directly
referenced after those words. Ministers did reference or quote scripture following those
words more often than they did not, but not by a wide margin. The Bible was quite often
given broad, sweeping descriptions. Spiritual warfare also proved to be a prominent
code. This included any reference to Hell, Satan, demons, evil, or the apocalypse.
However, only Robert Jeffress preached a sermon where one of these ideas fit onto the
“bumper sticker.” While this sample of ministers proved willing to use the idea of
spiritual warfare as an illustration or motivator, those ideas themselves were rarely the
point of the entire sermon.

14

I also included a code for “descriptions of God,” “descriptions of Jesus,” and “descriptions of the holy spirit.” This
did not produce a great deal of interesting patterns other than that these terms are largely used interchangeably.
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CHAPTER 5
CREDIBILITY AND AUTHORITY
The ministers in this sample display a tendency to describe the Bible in broadly
simplistic terms, deemphasizing their role as interpreters of the Bible in favor of
describing themselves as simple “messengers,” but they still must legitimize their
assertions by demonstrating exceptional knowledge or scholarship. While they do not
acknowledge any sort of inconsistency within the Scripture, they do acknowledge
inconsistency among interpretations of the Scripture. Thus the evangelical minister’s
primary utility—at least from the pulpit—is discerning faithful interpretation of the
unchanging Word of God from false doctrines that are tainted by the shifting moral
standards of culture at large.16 In order to do this effectively, they must establish their
authority as scholars by demonstrating esoteric knowledge of the Scripture. Most often,
this takes the form of referencing the Greek or Hebrew etymology of key words or
phrases and/or the history associated with those words or phrases.
A democracy is rule by majority. Let me tell you. If you go look up the
definition of democracy, they’ve changed it. They’ll say, “It’s where you
elect leaders and the leaders make the laws.” It’s really not what a
democracy is. They shouldn’t ask a politician what it is. They should ask a
preacher because it comes from two Greek words. (Robert Morris)
Circle the word in your bible there, “whose end is destruction”, circle the
word destruction. That word literally means, in the original Greek language
of the Bible, the physical, the spiritual, the eternal ruin, it’s nonstop eternal
ruin or loss of one’s being, to be damned or to be damnable, the result of
being condemned, not annihilated, but forever separated from God. (Jack
Hibbs)
Underline that word, judgment seat, saying, “This man persuades men to
worship God, contrary to the law.” The word translated judgment seat is
16

This, too, is a key point that should not be glossed over carelessly. Sorting out faithful Christians from fake
Christians is a visceral process in this sample of sermons and is more thoroughly examined later in the analysis.
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the word, Bema, in Greek. Bema. It refers to a raised platform, on which
the governor would sit. (Ronnie Floyd)

There is also a certain manner of presenting the information confidently, or taking
the role of teacher, which is demonstrated in each of the above quotes. All of these
ministers use various aids to help their congregation follow along with the sermon.
Robert Jeffress and Jack Hibbs distribute sermon outlines to the congregation, Ronnie
Floyd does the same but calls them “worship guides,” and each minister makes use of
projectors and large screens to post scripture passages, bullet points, and sometimes
video clips. Note-taking is often encouraged, as is circling words and phrases in each
congregant’s personal Bible.
Get your Bible. Look at it with me. Make a few notes along the way. The
worship guide you received when you came in the room will help you
know where I’m going in the Scripture. If you want to follow along, fine. If
you don’t want to write it down, that’s between you and God. (Ronnie
Floyd)

Further, this sample has numerous instances of the ministers relying on famous
ministers or Christian scholars for quotes or illustrations. Billy Graham, C.S. Lewis,
Charles Spurgeon—to name a few—are regularly quoted or referenced by this sample
of ministers. This sample also reveals a tendency to legitimate the speaker by referring
to other famous evangelicals as “my friend” or even, “my good friend.” Ministers
demonstrate the legitimacy of their authority by tacitly characterizing themselves as
members of an elite fraternity of Biblical scholars and holy and learned men. 17
My friend Erwin Lutzer says it this way. “Five minutes after you die, you
will either have had your first glimpse of Heaven with its euphoria and
17

The use of exclusive language here is intentional and significant.
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bliss, or your first genuine experience of unrelenting horror and regret.
Either way your future will be irrevocably fixed and eternally
unchangeable.” (Robert Jeffress)

By combining the confident demonstration of knowledge with familiar
pedagogical techniques these ministers are able to present themselves as Biblical
authorities who are worthy of their congregation’s attention and respect. However, it is
important for these ministers to maintain their humanity—after all, they, like everyone
else, have sinned and fallen short of God’s plan.
He did not come and die on a cross so He could have a portion of our
week on Sunday and then we ignore Him the rest of the week. And I’m not
preaching down to you, I’m preaching to me. (Jentezen Franklin)

Through this establishment of legitimacy, ministers gain the admiration and
allegiance of their congregations. For so many, they are the primary arbiters of what is
and is not Biblical Truth. In the evangelical community, there is a certain irony to the
scholarly authority held by the ministers. In order to maintain both their scholarly
authority and relatability, ministers must exude intellectualism even while discouraging
the use of individual intellect among their congregants. Evangelical thought is centered
on the strict obedience to the Word of God. They are taught not to question any portion
of Scripture and not to value one part of the Bible over another. The implication is that
relying on the Bible for guidance necessarily involves relying on a minister to guide
one’s understanding of the Bible, lest an otherwise well-meaning Christian will fall victim
to a false doctrine that will undoubtedly lead to their destruction. Evangelicals, according
to these ministers, need the guidance of a human authority to properly understand
God’s will for their lives and for the world. As Jack Hibbs says,
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People don’t have the maturity to process information anymore. We need
the wisdom of the Holy Spirit. The church is fragmented by non-truths.
“Well I think this and I want, and I’ve come to the conclusion,” Christians,
stop! Think Bible! Think Bible. God’s Truth must be always held
preeminent over all things.

Because “God’s Truth must be always held preeminent over all things,” and
because these worship leaders are weekly informing tens of thousands of people what
God’s Truth means within the context of modernity, evangelical ministers wield a type of
authority and influence that necessarily has political implications.
The Polemicist Preacher
Diagnostic framing is the process of identifying the grievances of a movement.
For the evangelical, the grievances are clear. The United States has turned its back on
God. An important piece of making this claim establishing that the United States is, and
always should be, a Christian nation. In this sample, however, that portion of the claim
is largely ignored. With a few exceptions, it seems that this fact is assumed. These
ministers tend to use phrases such as “turned our back” on God, or “forgotten” God. For
the most part, the rhetoric involved in the diagnostic framing task includes an imbedded
assumption that the America of old was a religious homology.
She is abused, the lady of liberty, the statue of liberty, in so many ways,
has been stripped, has been abused, we are not in the nation and the
America that we, many of us grew up in, and we understand that
something is happening to our nation.

This quote from Jentezen Franklin’s sermon entitled, “Pray, Fast, Vote,”
represents a ubiquitous sentiment in this sample of sermons. “Something” is happening,
and that “something” is that America is becoming a “fallen nation.” That it need not be
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established that America used to “more Christian” is a telling detail and speaks to the
Christian nationalist sentiment that coincides with evangelicalism. The common thread,
made visible by examining the diagnostic processes, is the notion that Christianity—not
even God or Christ per se, but the institution of Christianity—is what made America the
greatest nation in the world. To the evangelical, freedom itself is cognitively and
emotionally tied to the practice of Christianity because it is an entrenched tradition. The
audiences for these sermons do not need to be convinced that America is changing for
the worse, only reminded of it.
In this sense, the diagnostic framing work is inseparable from the motivational
framing work. These ministers rely on issues about which their audience seems largely
in agreement. When speaking about these issues, they are not only using them as
evidence of America’s failings, but also as a means of motivating their congregants to
act. Of particular importance is the assertion that there is no time to waste—that the
current state of affairs in the country and the world is direr now than ever before.
I’ve been a Christian for 40 years and I’ve never seen a time like this.
(Jack Hibbs)
Because I’m telling you, and you listen carefully; we have never been
anywhere close to where we are today. (Ronnie Floyd)

To illustrate this point, ministers rely on a few topical areas that they say indicate
America’s moral decline. Importantly, these issues are also staples of the Republican
Party’s platform.
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Abortion
We’re breaking records in America in aborting children.(Jentezen Franklin)
The priority of all this is the sanctity of human life, since 1973, almost 60
million babies have been aborted while in the womb of their mother.
(Ronnie Floyd)

The above quotes indicate how the issue is framed diagnostically and
motivationally. Abortion is framed as one of the great evils and displays how far America
has come from its “righteous” roots. At the same time, these are also instances of
ministers tapping a cultural identity of “conservative” Christianity to instill a sense of
urgency among the audience-members.
I’m not going to read the whole thing, but here’s one of the party platforms
says, “We assert the sanctity of human life and affirm that the unborn child
has a fundamental, individual right to life, which cannot be infringed.” It
goes on to say, “We believe the 14th Amendment protects the newborn
child. We do not believe that we should use government funds to pay for
abortions.” The other one believes that we should use government funds
to pay for abortions, that abortions should be legal for their full nine
months. That’s in their platform.
Here, Robert Morris engages in adversarial framing (“That’s in their platform”) and
motivational framing. He uses the issue of abortion to inspire his listeners to believe that
action must be taken. To close that sermon, he displays an image on the large video
screens in his church of a stillborn fetus, saying “you will never, ever convince me that
that is tissue and not a human baby. You will never convince me of that.” While abortion
is used a diagnostic frame, it is also clearly used motivationally. Perhaps more to the
point, when these ministers mentioned abortion they were not trying to convince their
audience to change their minds on the subject (it seems largely taken for granted that
43

their audience is already in agreement on the issue), but were leveraging the audience’s
emotions to form a cohesive collective action frame. They took an issue that arouses
contentious feelings and made it a central issue in determining how to vote. They did
not have to frame abortion as a negative, they could take for granted that their listeners
already saw it as a negative.
Same-Sex Marriage
Same-sex marriage is framed in a similar way as abortion. Ministers do not need
to dwell on convincing their audiences that same-sex marriage is a sin, only frame that
increasingly socially accepted sin as an indication of America’s moral decline.
Moreover, it illustrates the need for urgent action on the part of true, biblical Christians—
lest competing worldviews drag America further into cultural apostasy. As is the typical
style when addressing potentially controversial subjects, they rely on framing the issue
as “biblical.”
You think about the collision of worldviews relating to marriage. Bible
Christians should believe that marriage is between a man and a woman.
The colliding worldview is woman with woman, man with man, or whatever
else. You think about the family. A biblical Christian worldview lifts up the
family because we know the family is the moral fiber of the future of the
land.18

At the outset of this investigation, I thought I would encounter a great deal of rhetoric
involving same-sex marriage. As it turned out, same-sex marriage is more often
mentioned in passing, as when Jack Hibbs casually mentions “natural law,” or Jentezen

18

It is important to note that Ronnie Floyd, in the quote above, uses the term “bible Christian” to draw a
distinction between the right and wrong way to be a Christian. This language will be discussed in-depth in the
section “The Culture of Biblical Literalism.”
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Franklin says “pro-family.” This is an indication that these ministers know their audience.
In the minds of evangelicals, these are settled issues. It is good enough, for instance,
for Jentezen Franklin to mention that “we are legalizing abominations, that the Bible
calls abominations.” He does not need to tell his audience where in the Bible
homosexuality is labeled an abomination because the sinful nature of homosexuality
seems to be a given in the cultural context in which these ministers operate. When
same-sex marriage is mentioned, it is used as an illustration of a larger point.
And so now we have one man on the Supreme Court who decides, even
though state after state after state, including California, said we do not
want to legalize gay marriage, one Supreme Court justice, by a president
who put him there, now turns all of that around, and suddenly culture has
shifted. (Jentezen Franklin)

In the quote above, same-sex marriage is not the key point. Rather, Franklin is using
the idea of same-sex marriage as a motivating factor to convince his congregants to
vote in the presidential election because, as Franklin notes in that same sermon, “Three
Supreme Court justices will be put on the Supreme Court under the next president of
the United States.” Not only is this a motivational framing process, it also hints at the
prognosis. Simply put, solving these problems means that all evangelicals have a
responsibility to vote, and to vote for the candidate whose platform is most in line with
“biblical teaching.” Thus, the whole collective action frame begins to come into view.
The diagnosis is that culture is shifting away from true Godliness. The prognosis is that
true Christians exercise their right to vote. The motivation to do so is that the stakes are
extraordinarily high in the 2016 election, and that the church cannot, as Franklin put it,
“stand idly by.” As with abortion, same-sex marriage is not used a key point, but only as
an idea that is leveraged in constructing the collective action frame.
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Religious Freedom
In this sample, religious freedom is often framed in terms of public prayer. For
example, Jentezen Franklin expresses outrage at “the fact that we can’t, in America,
pray at ball games anymore. We can’t pray at graduations anymore.” Ronnie Floyd
mentioned
The nonsense of not being able to pray before a football game, the
nonsense of not being able to pray before a graduation ceremony, or the
nonsense of not being able to pray on a field of play, or on a court of play,
or anything else you want to play, or the nonsense of not being able to say
Merry Christmas at a department store, at Christmas time.

Once again, there was no effort to argue the reasons that public prayer should be
allowed. These ministers seemed to assume that their audiences were in agreement
that praying to “the God of the Bible” before sporting events was appropriate. On the
contrary, because praying before sporting events used to be commonplace, the lack of
public prayer seems—to the evangelical mind—to be an indication that the United
States is growing more and more inhospitable to Christianity. Ronnie Floyd certainly
believes this. After detailing a story where five ministers in Houston had their sermons
subpoenaed by the city’s mayor, Floyd painted a picture of a bleak future for the true
believer.19
I mean, we’re at a day and time when it’s not going be comfortable to
identify with the People of God, because the more and more government
overreaches the more challenging it’s going to be for us. All of you guys
and girls that are young in ministry and you’re believing that’s what God
wants you to do, there’s a real chance unless God brings awakening
you’re going be arrested for your faith one day.

19

For more on this story, see the Time.com article. <http://time.com/3514166/houston-pastors-sermonssubpoenaed/ > Last accessed 8/30/2017.
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Jack Hibbs also had a shocking story for his listeners regarding the open practice of
Christianity.
You want to get in trouble these days? Be a Christian in the United States
military. This week a friend of mine retired after 30 years of being a
commander the United States Navy. His departure service, his ceremony
was on the Midway this week in San Diego. He was told by the United
States Navy to shut up about your Christian faith or get out. He opted to
retire. 30 years of service. That’s okay. He’s going to go be a pastor now
and serve the Lord.

Not only does the world seem inhospitable to Christianity to the persecuted evangelical,
but there is clear connection between the “lack of God” and negative outcomes.
My heart breaks for our military because I love our military but the God of
the Bible says, “You honor me, I’ll go to battle with you.” He says, “You
dishonor me, and you go to battle on your own.” Just in the last couple
weeks, yet again, one of our special operations in the Middle East failed
miserably. Did you know? Have you stopped to think that the United
States has not won a war since 1945? Have you stopped to think about
that?

The Supreme Court
These issues often overlap. Ministers leverage certain ready-made religious
beliefs in constructing a collective action frame. Because it can affect laws regarding
abortion, same-sex marriage, and religious freedom the Supreme Court is often
lightning rod for framing activity, especially motivational and diagnostic. In terms of
diagnostic framing, the message is that the Supreme Court has the ability to shift culture
is particularly relevant, and once again alludes to the Christian nationalist sentiment that
fuels diagnostic framing processes, but this is also a useful motivational tactic.

47

One of the biggest issues that are right now in the culture has to do with
this issue of appointments, appointments, and appointments. Presidents
come and go but their appointments, long term, can outlive them by far. A
President can affect a generation, but their appointments can literally
affect generations… And for our eight years of the next president, he may
appoint as many as four justices, according to some estimates. This could
tilt America further towards Gomorrah, or put America towards more of a
will of God, where God might extend mercy to the nation, rather than
judgment.

In this example, Ronnie Floyd blends political and religious rhetoric to formulate a
distinct motivational frame. He frames the future of the country in binary terms, saying
the nation will face either God’s mercy or God’s judgement—and who is on the
Supreme Court is directly relevant to which of those paths are in store for the United
States. In this light, the prognosis is clear. True Christians must vote, and they must
take their identity as an evangelical Christian with them into the voting booth. This
section has highlighted some of the political consequences of identifying as an
evangelical, but now the analysis turns to using the concept of a frame analysis to
explore the emotional center of evangelical social movement through the words of their
elite speakers.

48

CHAPTER 6
BIBLE CULTURE

What you need to believe about the Bible is what the Bible says.
-Ronnie Floyd
The Bible always defines itself.
-Robert Morris
I’d rather be found guilty obeying the Bible.
-Jack Hibbs
People change. Culture changes. Churches change. But the Word of God
never changes.
-Jentezen Franklin
Adding to or taking away from the Bible is condemned by God.
-Robert Jeffress
Perhaps the most important finding produced by this analysis is how these
ministers tap into already existing cultural phenomena to help maintain the ideological
consistency of a “biblical” collective identity. One of the defining characteristics of
evangelical belief is that the Bible is inerrant and sufficient. The Bible, in its entirety, is
the inspired Word of God, and nothing that exists in its pages is subject for debate.
Furthermore, the Bible is the only reliable source of information about any spiritual
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matter. Each pastor in this sample distances himself from the “message” of the sermon
because he is only explaining what the Bible says. How these ministers approach the
Bible includes a vital distinction between “explaining” what the Bible says and
“interpreting” what the Bible says. The principles of inerrancy and sufficiency imply that
the Bible is not to be “interpreted,” because the process of interpretation could impute
human motives to the text and obfuscate its divine nature. Moreover, the Bible is
generally described in monolithic terms. The Bible, as described in these sermons,
offers a uniform code of conduct and belief wherein there is no room for nuanced or
contextual interpretation.
In reality, these ministers do infer meaning from the text and impute motives by
parsing scripture in calculated ways. For instance, in the following excerpt, Robert
Jeffress groups three separate verses from three different books of the Bible and
weaves them together to claim that Heaven will have hierarchical organization.
The Bible teaches some people are going to receive a special welcome
from God, like a ticker tape parade, according to 2nd Peter 1:11. Some
people are going to have special access to the “Tree of Life,” according to
Revelation 2:7. Some people will even have special treatment by Jesus
Himself. Jesus isn’t going to treat everybody the same in Heaven. There’s
special treatment according to Luke 12 verse 37.20

Most scholarly literature on the subject terms this phenomenon biblical literalism,
which survey researchers have used for decades as a key predictor of conservative

20

2 Peter 1:11 reads “11 and you will receive a rich welcome into the eternal kingdom of our Lord and Savior Jesus
Christ. Revelation 2:7 reads “7 Whoever has ears, let them hear what the Spirit says to the churches. To the one
who is victorious, I will give the right to eat from the tree of life, which is in the paradise of God.” Luke 12:37 reads
“37 It will be good for those servants whose master finds them watching when he comes. Truly I tell you, he will
dress himself to serve, will have them recline at the table and will come and wait on them.” (New International
Version).
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political identity (Franzen and Griebel 2013). While there are important theological
differences between biblical literalism and biblical inerrancy, there is little consequential
difference in terms of public opinion.21 Jelen (1990) did find that many respondents were
able differentiate between literalism and inerrancy in “ways that seem meaningful” (p.
312), but the general idea that the Bible should be interpreted as a monolithic authority
(typically measured as belief that the Bible should be interpreted “word for word”) has
consistently proven to be a statistically significant predictor for political conservatism
(Bielo 2009). Franzen and Griebel (2013) developed a metric to gauge beliefs regarding
the Bible where belief in an “active Bible” refers to a more nuanced reading, while belief
in a “received Bible” refers to a more literalist belief. They found that a “received Bible”
view is consistent with conservative stances on several key political issues. 22 While the
terminology varies (literalism, inerrancy, received bible), the central theme is that
political conservatives prefer a nominally simplistic view of how the Bible should be read
and obeyed. For this sample, ministers leverage that view of the Bible to frame their
most politically controversial stances as not explicitly political issues, but as biblical
issues. As a rhetorical device, this allows the ministers to mask political speech as
religious—or biblical.
For instance, there is no room to debate what the Apostle Paul meant by “sexual
perversions” or “abominations.” Homosexual contact is, according to these sermons,

21

In the way I use the terms going forward, inerrancy is more of theological idea, while literalism is more of a
cultural idea. Both of the terms point to the idea of strict obedience and downplay or disregard the role of logic
and reason in matters of morality.
22
Interestingly, Franzen (2013) found that those who espouse “literalist” views of the Bible report reading the
Bible less often than more traditionally “liberal” views of scripture interpretation. According to that study, there
seems to be an inverse relationship between biblical literalist beliefs and biblical knowledge.
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expressly forbidden by the Bible, and therefore is expressly forbidden by God Himself.23
The principles of inerrancy, sufficiency, and consistency coalesce to form an
impenetrable logic. The Bible is the Truth, is the only source of Truth on earth, is not
subject to nuanced interpretations, and is internally consistent in its entirety. Thus, the
ministers are able to somewhat distance themselves from their more controversial
claims. Moreover, ministers frame those potential controversies as settled biblical fact.
The rules they are articulating are not their own creation, they are Biblical Truths. This
enables the ministers to avoid a substantive debate about the earthly consequences, for
instance, of banning gay marriage because they contend that the Bible is clear on the
issue, and that those earthly consequences (dehumanization of a minority group, to
start) pale in comparison to the eternal consequences of violating God’s law. As Robert
Jeffress noted, “when compared to the glories of heaven, the worst suffering of this
world will one day be seen to be nothing more than a one-night stay in an inconvenient
motel.”
This process of masking politicking as dutifully sermonizing is particularly
prevalent when ministers address issues that have political implications or are
potentially controversial. Jentezen Franklin, when advising his congregants on how true
Christians should choose which political candidate should get their vote, offered several
broad generalizations about the Bible.
So what you have to do is get some absolutes. Are they pro-Israel?
Because the bible’s pro-Israel. Are they pro-life? Because the bible is prolife. Are they pro-family, meaning a man and a woman married raising a
family? Are they pro—is it, is it in this book? Cause if they’re, if, if we’re
23

In this paper I do not claim to fully dissect the “He God” concept, but acknowledge and highlight its broad
implications. In particular, the imputation of male gender to God demonstrates, from a constructionist
perspective, an embrace of traditional patriarchal hierarchies.
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legalizing abominations that the Bible calls abominations, God’s blessing
is not upon us.

Franklin then goes on to further deflect the controversial aspects of these assertions by
citing his obligation, as laid out in Scripture, to preach honestly and directly.
The Bible said a preacher that won’t preach is like a dumb dog that won’t
bark. That ain’t me, that’s the Bible!

Franklin describes the Bible holistically and with politically charged terminology,
offering his congregants a cognitive defense of controversial stances based on the only
legitimate source of moral authority. The congregants can, and must, refuse to
acknowledge any moral ambiguity because an established arbiter of Biblical Truth has
explained that the Bible is clear on the subject. In another instance of distancing the
message from the messenger, Robert Jeffress addressed the presence of protesters
who were demonstrating outside the First Baptist Church of Dallas one Sunday
morning. In the following excerpt, Jeffress, like Franklin, deflects the controversy away
from himself and instead champions the absolute moral authority of the Bible.
He says in verse 10, “But why, why do you judge your brother, or why
again do you regard your brother with contempt? You are not to judge
another.” I know some of you are probably thinking, “Well Pastor that’s
sure the pot calling the kettle black. You’re talking about not judging, why
haven’t you seen all these protesters out here this week? They’re upset
because you’re judging people. The LGBTQ. A few of them were here
earlier this morning. They’re upset because of what you’re saying. You’re
being judgmental.” Oh no, that’s not the kind of judgment He’s talking
about here. When we say, as a church, that marriage should be between
one man and one woman, that’s not our opinion. That’s not our judgment.
That’s God’s judgment. That’s what the Word of God has already said.
And when these people around here are protesting, they’re not protesting
me. They’re not protesting First Baptist Dallas. They’re protesting the
eternal and unchangeable Word of God.
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This quote demonstrates how framing work can be multi-faceted. Not only does
Jeffress frame a potentially controversial issue as a “biblical” issue, he also reinforces
collective identity when he states that “we say, as a church, that marriage should be
between one man and one woman.” All at once, using the issue of gay marriage as a
wedge, Jeffress engages in identity work that emphasizes the utter righteousness of the
true evangelical Christian. Bean (2014) noted the tendency for “rank-and-file”
evangelicals to be “political without being political” (p. 63), characterizing political issues
as “moral” issues. Evangelical leaders, as demonstrated in this sample, do not
characterize politically controversial topics as moral issues, but as biblical issues. With
the explicit understanding within evangelical faith that the Bible is the only recognized
source of moral authority—and that the Bible is inerrant, sufficient, and entirely internally
consistent—these sermons demonstrate how ministers help to make certain topical
beliefs unassailable in the minds of their congregants.
In terms of social movement framing, biblical literalism offers a cultural context
that framers tap in order to maintain their own credibility and reinforce a collective
identity. Williams and Alexander (1994) note that a movement culture is the most
essential component of boundary formation—distinguishing the “us” from the “them.”
The culture of biblical literalism or inerrancy is a defining aspect of the evangelicalism
as a social movement because it serves as a key context for framing processes.
Evangelical ministers are bound to this culture. While they objectively impute subjective
interpretation in their assertions, those interpretations must be consistent with the
cultural context from which ministers derive their credibility and authority.
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In this way, the Bible—as a symbol—becomes an ideological resource. Biblical
literalism, as an idea, gives rank-and-file evangelicals a common vocabulary for
articulating their beliefs. There is no need for convoluted political or social exposition if
ministers can call forth a singular ruling on a particular issue. The political stances that
are most commonly defended as being biblical principles—abortion and gay marriage,
specifically—are the very issues that spurred evangelical realignment in the 1970s and
1980s. Now these are firmly entrenched as fixed political stances for evangelicalism and
act as a sort of litmus test for true, biblical Christians. The symbol of the Bible is a
fundamental piece of evangelical movement ideology because it, recalling Williams and
Alexander (2004), “provide[s] adherents with a common language with which to attack
the evils of the world” (p. 3). Evangelicals can rely on the language of biblical obedience
to define their selves and their beliefs as apolitical. That this language is so often
invoked to advance or defend pillars of Republican Conservatism indicates a certain
compatibility between “Bible culture” and traditional conservatism that is worth closer
examination.
The Cultural Compatibility of Conservatism and Evangelicalism
This past week, we have watched and lived in one of the most historic
moments in the history of the United States, and around the world. The
ashen faces of the media told the story. Did you notice it? You see what
we need to understand is that those who have led and sold their lives out
to institutionalism and to the various establishments of our country, along
with the so-called intellectual elites. What they have gone through this
week is the astonishing and stunning reality of that is not where the heart
of America is. I mean we are living in a ‘we the people’ moment in this
country. Unquestionably a generational moment.
-Ronnie Floyd, November 20, 2016
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Holistic descriptions of the Bible in political terms highlight the intersection
between evangelical faith and conservative political ideology. Much attention has been
paid to differences in the way conservatives and liberals tend to process information.
Hunter (1991) contends that the distinctive characteristic is two general conceptions of
“moral authority,” terming the distinction as “orthodox” and “progressive.” An “impulse
toward orthodoxy” entails commitment “to an external, definable, and transcendent
authority,” meaning that adherents embrace rigid moral codes that are unaffected by
historical context. An “impulse toward progressivism,” on the other hand, conceptualizes
moral authority within the context of “the spirit of the modern age,” and sees “truth” as a
“process” (p. 43-44). Scholarship in this vein has taken a variety of forms. Psychologists
have asserted that conservatives tend to have a low tolerance for ambiguity and seek
“cognitive closure” (Jost et al. 2003; De Zavala, Cislak, and Wesolowska 2010), and
political scientists have articulated the distinction as “reflective liberals” and “intuitive
conservatives” (Deppe et al. 2015). While the distinction comes in a variety of terms, the
basic gist of this body of literature is that liberals tend to appreciate nuance and
subjectivity while conservatives often prefer definitive answers and situate acquired
knowledge within rigid cognitive constructs.24 In this sense, tendency for politically
conservative Christians to adhere to more literalist interpretations of the Bible seems
natural and predictable.
This sample demonstrates that evangelical thought is consistent with the
aforementioned descriptions of conservative thought. Evangelicals eschew nuance and

24

These are, of course, “ideal types.” In reality, these two categories are neither mutually exclusive nor exhaustive,
but simply help guide our understanding of an intangible phenomenon.
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complexity in favor of fixed, often binary understandings of the social world. This sample
of sermons proliferates with speech that illustrates this idea.
Just as Jesus was literally, and visibly brought from earth to heaven, one
day Jesus is literally and visibly going to return from heaven back to earth.
When Jesus comes, as some pagan, so-called Christians say, the second
coming of Jesus isn’t when he comes into your heart. I heard a well-known
preacher from another denomination said well now the second coming of
Jesus is when he comes into your heart. Obviously he never came into
that preacher’s heart, because he would know the truth! The Bible says he
is coming back visibly, literally and when he comes every knee will bow
and every tongue confess that Jesus Christ is lord. Heaven is a
geographical location.

In this sermon, Robert Jeffress tells his congregants that Heaven is not a state of
mind and that Jesus is not a complex spiritual entity, but that Heaven is physical place
and Jesus is a physical human being. There is no room here, as Jeffress explains, for a
metaphorical interpretation of scripture. Indeed, Jeffress notes that such an
interpretation is a false doctrine, and that its proponents are “pagans” who do not truly
know Jesus. Once again, Jeffress invokes the phrase “the Bible says…” to distance
himself from a seemingly harsh assertion, taking the role of “just the messenger.”
Moreover, the principle of strict obedience to the literal Word also indicates that, for
ministers, this idea not only serves to maintain the minister’s role as mere conduit, it
also taps into a cultural identity.
Sociologists of religion have come to describe this literalist interpretation of
scripture as a defining characteristic of a deeply ingrained culture (Franzen and Griebel
2013). The idea that there is a single source of moral authority that is fixed and
unaffected by new knowledge appeals to the “ideal type” of conservative mind. The
Bible is unchanging, and therefore moral standards should remain unchanged as well.
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Any sense of shifting moral standards can feel like an assault on this fixed source of
authority. This indicates a key facet of a cultural identity that shapes the way its
adherents make sense of the world around them. When ministers invoke phrases such
as the “the Bible says” or the “the Bible is,” they are tapping a base cultural resource,
and whatever words follow “the Bible says” should be unchallengeable on any front. But
more important than the actual scripture text is the culture of literalism. The Bible is then
used as an idea, a powerful symbol of a cultural identity that is resistant to progressive
changes in social structure; or perhaps more to the point, it is a cultural identity that
values and longs for the simplicity of having a single source for every answer to every
question.
The culture of literalism is larger than any single minister. In late 2016, popular
evangelical minister Andy Stanley drew criticism from other evangelical leaders when
he downplayed the importance of the Virgin Birth, saying he was less concerned with
specifics of Jesus Christ’s birth than he was with Christ’s resurrection. This seemed to
show at least some toleration of liberal Christian teachings that call the Virgin Birth into
question or disregard its significance. Several evangelical leaders, including the
president of the Southern Baptist Theological Seminary, Albert Mohler, publicly
criticized the statement as an unwelcome insertion of a liberal theology that denies
inerrancy. In the wake of the backlash, Stanley issued a statement in which he
reaffirmed his commitment to the principle of inerrancy, saying “I believe the Bible is
without error in everything it affirms. I believe what the Bible says is true, is true.”26 The
notion of even tolerating a nuanced, as opposed to literal, interpretation of the Bible was

26

http://www.outreachmagazine.com/features/19900-the-bible-says-so.html, last accessed September 23, 2017.
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quickly corrected by the larger evangelical community. Stanley’s original statement did
not inspire a theological discussion, but a stern rebuke. Even the hint of a nuanced
interpretation of scripture is incongruous with the culture of literalism.
It is this culture that lies at the heart of the Christian Right—the more explicitly
politically motivated movement of evangelicals—and this sample of sermons
demonstrates how this culture is mobilized as an electoral force. When political topics
are framed as biblical issues, they become cognitive certainties to those who identify
with a strict biblical literalist culture. But as much as “Bible culture” provides cognitive
closure for its adherents, it also is a source of emotional stability and comfort. Recall
that Jasper (2017) noted the tendency for social movement scholars—when focusing on
the important role of identity in framing processes—to give primacy to cognitive effects
over emotional effects. The overlap between conservative politics and evangelicalism
may well be mostly a phenomenon that is cognitive in nature, but the ability for the
Christian Right mobilize this overlap as a political resource has a great deal to do with
what it feels like to be an evangelical Christian for whom the Bible is a symbol of
singular truth. The evangelical identity provides a sense of emotional comfort that is
driven by the firmly held belief in their singular righteousness.
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The Exclusivity of Righteousness: Boundary Framing as Identity Work
Let me make a distinction between the Christians’ judgment and the nonChristians’ judgment. I’ve given you a sentence on your outline I want you
to fill in. ‘The judgment seat of Christ is for the commendation of believers
while the great white throne judgment is for the condemnation of
unbelievers. The result of the judgment seat of Christ will be eternal
rewards. The result of the great white throne judgment will be God’s
eternal punishment.’
-Robert Jeffress

Broadly stated, the collective action frame constructed within this sample is that
true Christianity is in decline in America and that true Christians have an obligation to
participate in the electoral process and to vote “biblically.” Unpacking that frame
involves a dissection of what exactly the “biblical” vote entails. Doing that lays bare the
cultural heart of evangelicalism. The “biblical” vote is a vote to protect a cultural identity
that is often perceived as being under siege from “worldly” forces. There is a distinct air
of defiance imbedded in this collective action frame. Evangelicals who hear these
sermons and identify with the larger cultural context from which these congregations
draw their large numbers may be emboldened to confidently and defiantly resist any
perceived outside influence on that culture.
In modern evangelical culture, the problems facing the country and the world are
not complex. The Bible is the answer. That cognitive closure, the absolute certainty of
that sentiment, provides millions of Americans with comfort and peace of mind. The
social movement that stems from this culture, then, is mobilizing to protect a sense of
safety, security, and a confident understanding of their world, the same understanding
held by generations of true believers that came before. As Franklin said, “His Word has
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not changed! Culture has! America has! But this book has not!” Belief in the static
nature of morality and religious righteousness is comforting to the evangelical and
conservative mind, and the loss of that comfort can feel like a threat to social order and
can produce emotional responses.
In social movement studies, boundary maintenance in described as an aspect of
diagnostic framing. The standard blueprint for social movement studies begins with
identifying grievances that the movement is seeking to address or is petitioning an
authority to address. Boundary maintenance is included in diagnostic framing because
many social movements claim that an injustice has been wrought on a particular group
of people, thus identifying who is and is not in that group of people is an essential
component of diagnosing injustice. In this sample, boundary framing strikes a somewhat
different tone and is worthy of its own consideration, independent from diagnostic
processes.
As previously discussed, evangelicalism and political conservatism are
compatible because the “word for word” interpretation of the Bible is attractive to those
who generally seek cognitive certainties that often form binary understandings. For the
evangelical, no binary is more certain than salvation and damnation. The dichotomy of
“saved” and “unsaved” forms an ostensibly clear in-group/out-group distinction: those
who have accepted Christ and those who have not. Despite that fairly simple divide,
entrance to Heaven is carefully guarded and represents an important source of
evangelical identity. The exclusivity of salvation is a major theme throughout this
sample. There are, according to these ministers, far more people who are not saved
than who are. Robert Jeffress states it quite plainly. “There is a road that leads to
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eternal death and Jesus said most people are on that road.”27 As Jeffress describes it,
everyone is born on a path to Hell, and only by being “born again” as a Christian can an
individual get on the path to Heaven.
This sample produces evidence that many evangelicals fixate on a particular
“born again” moment, or a specific point in time after which salvation is promised and
the Christian becomes “saved.” This is an especially major point of emphasis for Jack
Hibbs and Ronnie Floyd. Floyd’s sermon entitled “Can I Lose My Salvation?” revolves
entirely around that fact. He quotes Jonathon Edwards (whom he says is the smartest
man to ever walk on American soil) in saying that “true salvation” is always
accompanied by “an abiding change in the nature of the convert.” In answering the
question that gave that sermon its title, Floyd declares that for the true Christian, in
whom there has been that abiding change, salvation is never at risk. For Floyd and
Hibbs especially, true salvation is found at a specific moment in time after which
everything changes. Jack Hibbs describes his own experience after being “saved.”
One of the most profound things when you’re a new believer is, I
remember this when I became a believer, first time, I remember returning
back after becoming a Christian, because I lived right down the street from
South Coast Plaza in Orange County, and I used to love shopping there
and being there and hanging out there just kind of cool and all this stuff.
Then I got saved. I walked back into that glitzy mall and it was so hollow
and empty.

A true Christian’s spiritual birth is necessarily followed by a visceral change in behavior
and a new perspective by which the world is viewed. This is a key point of defining the
boundaries between the in-group and the out-group. Willful nonbelievers, atheists and
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Note the use of “Jesus said” without referring to a specific passage of scripture.
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agnostics as described in this sample, are clearly in the out-group, but false Christians
are just as dangerous, probably even more so, to the maintenance of a cohesive
evangelical identity. The idea that there is only one right way to be a Christian is, once
again, part of the framing process insulates evangelicalism from outside influence. At
the same time, it fosters that sense of comfort that represents so much of the value that
individual congregants can derive from membership in the in-group.
The guarantee of salvation for the true believer is the ultimate source of comfort.
Jentezen Franklin says that “we’re not afraid of anything that the book of Revelation
says is going to happen because we are overcomers, by the blood of the Lamb.” As
Jack Hibbs puts it, “truly, surely, your name is secured in the book of life if you’re
trusting and obeying Christ.” To be “saved” is to know that this life is only temporary,
and that eternity will be blissful. Robert Jeffress reminds his congregation that “we think
this world is our home. It’s not. It’s not. It is a temporary location.” The comforting nature
of salvation also includes God’s forgiveness. While the true Christian is defined by “an
abiding change” of nature, no one is without sin and everyone needs forgiveness. The
true Christian will sin, but will also confess and ask for God’s forgiveness, which will be
granted without end for the true Christian. The evangelical can find powerful intrinsic
comfort in belonging to God or Jesus.28 Even Ronnie Floyd, whose admiration of the
author of “Sinners in the Hands of an Angry God” is unabashed, asserts that, for the
true Christian, salvation is an unearned gift from God and that

28

For the purpose of this analysis, God, Jesus, and the Holy Spirit are used interchangeably. A theological reading
of these sermons would almost certainly provide a wealth of fascinating data regarding the concept of the Trinity
in evangelical Protestantism. For this analysis, however, the scope must remain narrowed on the social movement
culture that these sermons reveal. An in-depth understanding of the Trinity does not seem to be a defining aspect
of that culture.
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…sin cannot take you out of Jesus’s hand. Not one sin…Satan cannot
take you away from Jesus. He can’t, he’s unable, he is incapable…Once
Jesus has you, you’re his. So to answer that question. Can I lose my
salvation? Absolutely not! It is absolutely impossible to lose what you did
not earn! And it’s absolutely impossible to lose when Jesus has you in his
grip!

But while the guarantee of salvation is a source of comfort, the exclusivity of
salvation is a source of trepidation. Since the vast majority of the world is of a culture
inconsistent with the more favorable category of salvation, every evangelical lives in a
larger culture that is infested with evil forces. This dynamic is central to the collective
action frame and the establishment of boundaries. As Robert Jeffress said, “let’s face it,
it’s hard to keep our lives clean in a polluted world like this one, isn’t it?” All around the
true Christian are forces actively seeking to separate the believer from the Truth.
Importantly, the out-group is not only comprised of atheists and agnostics (who
are often treated in these sermons with extraordinary contempt and bewilderment), but
of professing Christians who teach false, even “demonic” doctrines. Hibbs warns
against the “demonic, shifty doctrines [that are] hard to detect unless you have the
truth.” In a previously quoted excerpt from Robert Jeffress, he declared a minister who
offered a metaphorical interpretation of the Second Coming of Christ was a “pagan, socalled Christian” who does not truly know Jesus. These false doctrines work to splinter
and divide the larger church community and separate otherwise well-meaning people of
faith from true spiritual rebirth. For many evangelicals, including Jack Hibbs, the
intrusion of theological complexity necessitates a clear split.
Do you see the division that’s happening in the so-called body of Christ
today? I’m just asking you. Do you see it happening among those who
claim to be Christians? I do…Can you sense that there is a necessary,
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painful though it may be, a necessary separation happening among those
who profess to be Christians?

The language that describes the eternal fate of the out-group is harsh, but
delivered with a matter-of-fact frankness. Those who are not true Christians will face
“destruction,” “damnation,” and will be “cast into the lake of fire.” Unabashed
nonbelievers and unsaved church goers will meet the same fate—this notion once again
harkens back to evangelicalism’s appeal to minds that tend to deny ambiguity. The
question of salvation is not complicated, and any attempt to make it so is a doctrine of
demons designed to tear the church, the country, and the world apart.
Often the language that describes the voices of the out-group is apocalyptic in
nature. Jack Hibbs warns of “demonic” doctrines, as does Robert Jeffress. Robert
Morris, when asserting that Jesus would only return when Jewish people have accepted
Christ as the messiah, said
Think about this, do you think Satan knows this? He begins to say, that
Jewish people don’t need to be saved. So if this says that when they
accept the messiah, the second coming’s coming, then Satan comes
around and says well they don’t need to accept the messiah.

Thus, any teaching that is inconsistent with the common evangelical narrative of what is
“biblical” is not only erroneous, but could be a ploy by Satan himself to stop or delay
Christ’s ultimate victory. Even well-meaning Christians who promote a non-apocalyptic
interpretation of scripture may have unknowingly become pawns of Satan. Framed in
this manner, the righteousness of conservative Christianity is buttressed by the
depiction of a fallen world. That fallen world is separate from the world of the truly
faithful. In another sermon, Robert Morris described church as a refuge and the source
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of defense against the satanic elements of the world. He referenced several Old
Testament passages that mentioned “coming in” and “going out” to and from war. He
then analogized this with living as a Christian in today’s popular culture.
When we come to church, if you’ve just lost a war, or lost some battle in
your life, in an area of your life, we come in and repent. If we’ve won some
war, or some battle, we come in and rejoice. And if we’re still in the middle
of it, we come in to God’s presence and we’re refreshed.

Morris, by far the most tactful minister in this sample, implies here that being a true
Christian is a constant battle. Later in the same sermon, Morris uses a bit of levity to
describe the comfort and protection that comes from fully identifying as a true Christian
in a world in the midst of a spiritual war.
See, think about walking around, we’re in a war! But think about walking
around with Jesus right there with you. You think a demon’s gonna attack,
I mean, God’s right there! Think about, um, you’ve seen this in a movie or
a television show, you know, where some bullies are about to beat up a
guy, you know. And maybe he, you know, he’s got this tough friend.
Alright here’s a good example, Richie Cunningham. And who? The Fonze!
And so they’re about to, you know, they’ve got Richie by the coat like this,
and they’re about to beat him up and then the Fonze, “heeeeeey,” shows
up. “What’s going on here?” And what do they do? “Nothing Fonzy, we’re
just straightening his coat, you know,” I’m telling you. Satan comes and
he’s about to beat up on you, and you had your quiet time that day, and
Jesus comes around the corner and says, “What’s going on here?” And
Satan says, “Nothing. Nothing.” And just backs off.

At a glance, this excerpt seems to indicate a classic lesson of general spirituality.
Through meditation and belief, a spiritual person can find the strength to overcome
obstacles on the way to self-actualization. However, as a framing process, this excerpt
indicates how the collective identity of the “saved” is reinforced when he states that
“we’re” in a war. He references internal struggles and personal battles, but then he
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takes those deeply personal issues and places them in the context of an allencompassing war for the soul of humanity. Thus, internal battles and struggles that all
individuals face are framed as a spiritual war—a war with only one “right” side. There is
no way to salvation except through full buy-in to biblical culture’s saved and unsaved
dichotomy.

67

CHAPTER 7
LIFTING THE VOTE
At its very base, the prognostic frame is rather simple. In order to fight against
the erosion of Christian values in the country, Christians must form a “united front” (Jack
Hibbs) at the polls. To this end, ministers were careful to assert that they were not
“being political,” but being “biblical.”
But listen carefully, you need register to vote as soon as you possibly can,
and be ready for November. You say “Well, that’s political.” No it’s not
political, it’s biblical. God wants us to be involved in this process. We get
to live out our faith. One day you will stand before God just like I will, at
what we call the Judgment Seat of Jesus Christ, and we will answer to
God for our decision making. No matter what it’s about. (Ronnie Floyd)

In another example of multi-faceted framing, Ronnie Floyd gives the prognosis—vote—
and also provides a motivational frame that reminds his audience that God’s judgement
leaves nothing out. How one votes, as well as who one votes for, will be a decision for
which God will hold each person accountable. Other instances of ministers urging their
listeners to vote are less severe, but still press its importance in other ways.. Jack
Hibbs, for instance, lashed out repeatedly at liberal Christians whom he blames for the
political division among professing Christians.
Should Christians be allowed to vote? That’s a note I wrote to myself. You
say, “How dare you say that?” Well, hang on a minute. Christians don’t
seem to be educated enough to vote. They don’t seem to be Biblical
enough to vote. They don’t know what the Bible says about voting.

Here, Hibbs again taps into the broader cultural context by framing the action in the
vocabulary of strict biblical obedience. The Bible is used as a symbol around which
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evangelicals can rally confidently and can cognitively and emotionally defend their
convictions. For those who identify as “biblical” Christian, this is a powerful motivator.
Motivational framing from the pulpit, in this sample, almost always features a
reinforcement of the evangelical identity—ministers claim that the call to vote is made all
the more urgent by the prevalence of misguided believers.
The following is a portion of a sermon in which Robert Morris makes an
impassioned plea for his congregation to vote. It is a useful example because it gives
context for how these framing processes come together to encourage a specific action.
James, Chapter 2, Verses 15 through 17. “If a brother or sister is naked
and destitute of daily food, and one of you says to him, ‘Depart in peace,
be warmed and filled, but you do not give them the things which are
needed for the body, what does it profit?’ Thus also, faith, by itself, if it
does not have works, is dead.” In other words, if we don’t do something,
we’re in trouble. There are about 100 million evangelicals in America. One
hundred million evangelical Christians. Now, hear me. Less than half of
evangelicals are registered to vote. Less than half. In the last Presidential
election, less than half registered voted.

The diagnostic frame, in this case, is a lack of electoral participation by evangelicals.
That he qualifies this term is of vital importance. He is not speaking to all Christians,
only those who identify as evangelicals. The binary nature of salvation, though not
typically a major point of emphasis for Morris (at least not nearly as much as it is with
the other four ministers in this sample), is leveraged here as an identity. He does not
define what evangelical means but knows that his congregants identify as such, and
thus he is tapping collective evangelical identity as a cultural resource. His audience is
part of a culture that believes in a single path to salvation for all people. Morris
continues.
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Here’s what we do so many times. “Well, I don’t like either candidate, so
I’m not voting for either one.” Well, you just voted. I’m telling you again, a
non-vote is a vote…Again, I’m going to say some strong things in the
message. We’re not a democracy. I don’t know if you know that. We are
not a democracy. We are a republic…Now, I’m going to explain
something. Hang on. Hang onto your seats, though. All right? But, what it
means is, in a true democratic nation, people actually vote on the laws. In
a republic, it means rule by Constitutional law. We are a republic, listen,
with a democratic process. We elect leaders, who are supposed to uphold
our Constitution…for years now, we have sat home and those who are
trying to change our Constitution are voting. That’s right. They are
changing it. They are interpreting it. They are saying, “That’s not
constitutional.” For instance, they said, “It’s not constitutional to pray in
schools.” Look’s what happened in the violence in our world since we did
that. That’s right.

Here, Morris demonstrates his authority as an intelligent, studied actor worthy of
attention and respect. He pauses several times and repeatedly highlights that he is
saying something of urgent import and that his audience should listen intently. Then he
makes a distinction that is, at its core, a distinction between conservative and
progressive political philosophies. Upholding the Constitution is juxtaposed with
changing the Constitution. This is a boundary framing process wherein an adversary is
implied. He repeatedly uses the word “they,” which reinforces that the group in question
is unequivocally not with “us.” The “they” in this case are those who want to change the
country and the Constitution, and Morris implies that “the violence in our world” is a
direct result of those seeking to change the Constitution by removing prayer in schools.
Not only does this (not so) subtly reinforce the link between conservative politics and
evangelical identity, but casts the out-group of non-believers and misguided Christians
as the source of “violence in our world.”
It’s very, very important that you vote. It’s very important.
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With evangelical identity firmly reinforced as a natural companion of conservatism, his
motivational phrasing here should not be overlooked. He emphasizes how important it is
that “you” vote. Having already asserted that “those who are trying to change our
Constitution,”—the “they,” the out-group—“are voting,” Morris has established to whom
it is that he is speaking. It is “very, very important” that his audience vote. Next, he finds
another way to reinforce the connection between conservatism and evangelical identity
by tapping another traditional source of cultural delineation.
Now, I’m going to give you one statement from our Declaration of
Independence and tell you that most politicians who quote this, don’t
believe it. I’ll show you what I mean. Here’s the statement and you know it.
“We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal,
that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable rights.”
You might think that I’m going to zoom in on the word “equal”…that’s not
the word that most politicians don’t believe. Here’s the word they don’t
believe. The word, “created.” We are “created equal” and endowed by our
Creator. Here’s what many politicians believe, “evolved.” Listen to me
carefully. If you don’t believe we were “created,” you will never believe
we’re equal. That’s right. People don’t evolve equally. They don’t. We
learn at different paces. I’m not talking now about race, I’m talking about
any person. We were created. It’s the foundation of our government, is
that the rights that we have, have not been given to us by the government,
but they’ve been given to us by almighty God, our Creator.

This is an example of a framing process that serves as “remedial ideological work”
(Snow and Benford 2000: p. 9). Evolution still provides a useful resource to tap in the
framing process because it indicates a literalist worldview. In order to accept evolution
as a scientific reality, Christians must alter their reading of Genesis to allow for at least
some amount of metaphorical or nuanced interpretation. Evangelical rejection of
evolution speaks to the air of defiance that fuels the enthusiasm of the evangelical
social movements. When Morris referenced his church’s collective rejection of evolution,
he was reminding them who they are: God’s people, warriors fighting in the only war
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that has ever truly mattered, holding in their hearts the only path to eternal salvation,
and grievously outnumbered by people in the world who think they are—as Jentezen
Franklin is fond of saying—“smarter than God.”
That evolution can be used as another issue to reinforce the evangelical identity
shows that this belief among evangelicals is grounded in a specific culture and tradition.
Less important than the science of evolution is what it feels like. Not only does it speak
to the defiant nature of evangelical identity, but shows how that identity can be
emotionally tied to political action. The adversarial framing work that Morris undertakes
in this instance—the “they” that seek to change the Constitution—is an essential aspect
of the larger collective action frame. Evangelical social movements are pitted squarely
against progressivism because, at its core, evangelical identity hinges on a uniform
concept of tradition. That tradition is largely expressed through Christian nationalist
sentiment, and manifested in political action that opposes progressive social change in
almost any form.

72

CHAPTER 8
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
Discussion
Within this sample, each of the core framing tasks, or processes, involved in
constructing a collective action frame are observable. The first task, diagnostic framing,
includes both boundary framing and adversarial framing. By tapping into an already
established cultural identity, this sample demonstrates how in-group/out-group
distinctions are made, and how those distinctions reinforce that base cultural identity.
Adversarial framing occurs simultaneously; any person or phenomenon that is not
expressly of the literalist culture is a spiritual enemy. Once the boundary lines are
drawn, the diagnostic framing process—in large part—comes in characterizing current
events as consequences of the key issue. In this sample, natural disasters, civil unrest,
“inner-city” violence, abortion rates, gay marriage, terrorism, intellectual elitism, and
changing rules dictating the practice of Christianity all are framed as symptoms the
larger problem of the loss of Christian hegemony in America.
Christian nationalism is the sentimental root of the diagnostic framing process.
The notion that America has “turned its back on God” indicates the esteem with which
evangelicals hold traditional social patterns. Diagnostic framing work emphasizes the
problems with recent social changes—same-sex marriage is a perfect example—that
may feel like an erosion of the tradition that, to the evangelical, made America great.
Imbedded in this frame of “traditional family values” is a fervent desire to maintain social
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institutions—male-headed households, for instance—that progressive movements have
intentionally sought to change.
The prognostic framing task, then, dictates how movement adherents—in this
case constituents of a cultural identity—can act to make a difference. Except for Robert
Jeffress, who still engaged in all of these framing processes, each minister in this
sample dedicated at least one entire sermon to encouraging their congregants to vote,
and to vote “faithfully,” or in the language of the culture, to vote “biblically.” Each
minister, without specifically endorsing a candidate by name, identified key issues that
should inform the righteous Christian vote.29 Finally, the process of motivational framing
takes the form of describing the extreme nature of the central problem. This sample
produced a plethora of instances where ministers referenced the enormous “stakes” of
the 2016 election, and described the current time period as unlike any other in history.
Moreover, motivational framing included detailing the dire consequences of inaction.
Contrary to my expectations at the outset, I did not find explicit defenses of key
wedge issues. At times, the similarities between these sermons and a Republican
candidate’s stump speech are striking. However, these instances are—to varying
degrees—fairly isolated. The majority of the political framing work is much more
layered. While it is worth noting that ministers engage in predictable political polemics
from the pulpit, it is of far more sociological value to understand the cultural foundations
that undergird and give credibility to this type of sermonizing. It is important to note that

29

Jack Hibbs represents something of an outlier in this sample in terms of how far he was willing to push the
envelope in terms of candidate endorsement. Still, he never explicitly told his congregants to vote for a particular
candidate, but was far less subtle than the others in identifying which party platform was more in line with a
“biblical” worldview—and the others were not at all subtle.
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this political rhetoric did predictably occur during the 2016 election cycle, but the deeper
question is why the evangelical church is such a welcoming platform for this type of
speech.
At no point did any of the ministers in the sample offer prolonged explanations for
why issues such as abortion and same-sex marriage are incompatible with biblical
teaching, these issues are only referenced in an appeal to emotions. This points to the
interactional nature of identity work. While this study maintains a focus on elite rhetoric,
broader evangelical culture operates as a discursive field from which ministers draw
legitimacy and influence. Despite their status as leaders of evangelical movements,
ministers are bound to some specific cultural contexts. At once, these contexts limit the
ministers and also serve as symbolic resources that can be tapped in framing
processes.
Symbolic interactionism, as it turned out, became a far more important theoretical
perspective than I anticipated. Resource Mobilization Theory of social movements tends
to focus on tangible resources such as money, supplies, or personnel. That
conceptualization still proves useful to frame analysis because, through the construction
of a collective action frame, emotions prove to be crucial resources that can mobilize
movement adherents—especially when the prognosis is as simple as voting. Although I
did not find explicit, scriptural foundations for those key wedge issues, how and when
these ministers referenced those issues was foundational to my findings. These issues
serve as emotional resources, as when Robert Morris displayed an image of a
miscarried fetus. His purpose there was not, I infer, to convince anyone to become prolife, but to tap deeply held opinions to evoke an emotional response.
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The argument that I have advanced in this study is limited by the type of speech I
elected to analyze. To varying degrees, each minister in this sample is bound by the
1954 Johnson Amendment which mandates that tax-exempt organizations refrain from
endorsing a candidate or political party “directly or indirectly.”30 Each of the ministers in
this sample arguably violated the Johnson Amendment at some point during the
election cycle, but to focus solely on those instances is disingenuous to the general
themes of the sermons. For the most part, these ministers give earnest advice to their
congregants, each striking their own balance between offering comfort and challenge.
Because this rhetoric is not explicitly political, it has its limitations in terms of
understanding a political social movement such as the Christian Right. Rather, the focus
was narrowed to the cultural context from which the Christian Right draws its resources.
My findings and conclusions are limited in that they are largely inferred, and the framing
work not necessarily undertaken intentionally—at least not one hundred percent of the
time.
A second limitation that I must note is that this study can only speak to white
evangelicalism as a general characteristic. This is not a simple categorization.
Evangelical megachurches—newer ones especially—are among the most racially
diverse congregations in the country (Thumma and Travis 2007), and the numbers of
Black and Hispanic evangelicals remain high. In fact, Black evangelicals are one of the
few categories of religious participation that saw an increase from 2007 to 2014 (Pew
RLS 2014). Ministers in this sample tend to embrace “feel good” rhetoric regarding race.

30

At the time of the final revisions to this paper, Rep. Walter Jones (NC) has introduced a measure to repeal the
Johnson Amendment. https://www.congress.gov/bill/115th-congress/house-bill/172/text last accessed 11/5/2017.
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For instance Jentezen Franklin passionately told his congregation that he would not let
anyone “divide us up” by race, and Robert Morris often speaks of his love for his
multiracial grandson. On the whole, this analysis shows that popular evangelical
ministers are careful to use inclusive rhetoric, remaining adamant that God’s love and
Christ’s sacrifice is for absolutely any person who will accept it. However, despite the
diversifying congregations, these churches still fall into the general category of “white
evangelicals” because they are distinct from black or Hispanic evangelical churches,
which have their own distinctive characteristics. The diversity within the evangelical
megachurch is an interesting dynamic that should be further examined by sociologists
of religion and race studies.
Conclusion
This study has been an examination of elite evangelical rhetoric and what that
rhetoric demonstrates about evangelical political participation. The overlap between
evangelical faith and conservative politics did not occur naturally but was intentionally
forged through decades of denominational restructuring and political maneuvering, but
the success of the Christian Right in the United States depended (and still depends) on
more than just the actions of the evangelical elite. By examining the content of the
sermons of a few of the nation’s most prominent evangelical ministers, I conducted this
study to better understand the link between the evangelical elite and the “rank-and-file”
evangelical whose collective action continues to have a remarkable influence on
electoral politics and public policy in the United States.
The collective action frame, when broken down into specific framing tasks, exists
to increase the voter turnout of self-identifying evangelicals. Even when ministers are
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not actively engaging political topics, they are at work reinforcing and defining
evangelical identity. As a part of the diagnostic framing task, evangelicals come to see
themselves as separate from the world in which they live—a world that is “corrupted by
sin.” At a larger level, the remedy for this problem—the prognostic frame—is for
evangelicals to live their lives in obedience to the Bible and to spread the message of
exclusive salvation whenever and wherever possible. In an election year, the prognosis
also includes describing voting as a Christian or even biblical duty. Furthermore, the
prognostic frame includes directions on how to “vote biblically.” To motivate their
congregants to do this, ministers in this sample used various methods of
operationalizing evangelical identity. Observing and analyzing this process produced
several key findings regarding culture of evangelical identity.
The first key finding produced by this analysis is that the Bible—as an idea more
than as a book—is a powerful cultural symbol. The Bible serves as the rhetorical
standard for defending politically precarious stances; but more than that, the idea of the
Bible serves as the marker of true righteousness. “Biblical” Christians are juxtaposed
with “pagan” or “false” Christians. Congregants are advised to “vote biblically” and, in
times of struggle, to “think Bible.” In terms of framing processes, biblical inerrancy or
literalism is far more a cultural artifact—as an object of identity work—than a theological
principle. Time and again, ministers in this sample use the idea of the Bible to reinforce
boundaries, diagnose the root of national concerns, and motivate specific political
action. At each step in this process, ministers are mobilizing evangelical identity as
“Bible Christians” to advance the political agenda of the Christian Right. Done in this
way, ministers are able to engage in polemics while still claiming to be apolitical.
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According to these sermons, evangelical ministers are not advancing a political agenda
when advising which political platform is closer to “biblical standards,” but are
advocating eternal, inerrant Truth.
This leads into the second key finding of this analysis: the overlap between
evangelical faith and conservative politics is largely a cognitive phenomenon, but is
operationalized through appeals to emotion. Conservatives tend to seek cognitive
closure and search for absolutes. The infallibility of biblical teaching, when coupled with
the assertion that the Bible is entirely internally consistent, appeals to those who have
that need for cognitive certainty. As a part of that need for certainty, conservatives place
a high value on fixed moral standards; this lends itself to the idea that the Bible is the
only valid source of moral wisdom because the Bible, as noted repeatedly in this
sample, “has not changed.” The notion of fixed morality and biblical inerrancy form the
context for most of the framing work in this sample. The issues facing the country are
not portrayed as complex, but can be reduced to rhetorical descriptions of a nation that
has “turned its back on God,” or—perhaps more to the point—turned its back on the
Bible. Thus the solution is even simpler than the diagnosis and is summed up nicely by
Jentezen Franklin: “The church is the only answer! The Bible is the only answer! Jesus
is the only answer!”
Imbedded in this frame (that the country is moving away from God and that the
Bible is the answer) is the idea that the nation’s past was more Christian or more
biblical. That this fact need not be established indicates that the cultural resources that
are being tapped in these framing processes are conservative by nature. In the 1970s,
there were prominent evangelicals who would likely point to (moderate) advances in
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social justice as being consistent with the essence of Christ’s teachings. As evidenced
in this sample, any advocacy for a “social Gospel” where equality is given primacy over
tradition is not a point of emphasis by the evangelical elite. Rather, the boundaries that
are drawn and vociferously maintained emphasize exclusion over inclusion.
The modern world, as it is described by these ministers, is a sinful and wicked
place, corrupted by evil, and is determined to lure away true believers with false
teachings that might “feel good” but are actually demonic doctrines. True believers,
according to these ministers, are called to divorce themselves from their “feelings” and
“do what God says is right,” a frame that works exceptionally well in a culture that lauds
singular authority. In an election year, “what God says is right” is defined rather narrowly
in terms of supporting party platforms. Four of the five ministers preached at least one
sermon where they specifically mentioned party platforms, and none of them showed
any equivocation. As appeals to the cultural context that is the source of modern
evangelical identity, there was one—and only one—clear option in the 2016 election.
The roots of evangelical sentiment—the emotional core of evangelicalism—is
imbedded in a traditionalism that is largely typified by Christian nationalism. Throughout
this analysis, traditional values have been framed as the bedrock of American
exceptionalism. To the evangelical, protecting that tradition goes beyond politics, but is
part of American and Christian identity alike. The comfort and peace that identity
provides is a source of certainty in what feels like an uncertain world (and framing
processes reiterate that uncertainty). Like Ronnie Floyd says, when Jesus has you, he
has you and he won't let you go no matter what. But the reward of salvation is not for
everybody, not even everybody that goes to church, and can only be secured by full80

fledged commitment to biblical Christianity as a master status. Jack Hibbs over and over
again uses phrases like "if you're a Christian," or "if you're saved," often even providing
the telling adjective "really," saying "if you're really a Christian you will…" That ties that
sentiment to an identity that, in turn, is tied to eternal salvation and earthly happiness,
which—understandably—has serious emotional consequences at the individual level,
and can be a powerful motivator of collective action.
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